Effects of Framing,Group Size, and the Contribution Mechanism on Cooperation in Threshold Public Goods and Common Resources Experiments

決策架構、群體規模、與捐獻機制在有門檻的公共財與共同資源實驗中對實驗對象合作行為的影響

10.29628/AEP.200303.0001

徐麗振(Li-Chen Hsu)

實驗 ； 公共財 ； 決策架構 ； 群體規模 ； 捐獻機制 ； Esperiments ； Public goods ； Framing ； Group size ； Contribution mechanism

經濟論文

31卷1期（2003 / 03 / 01）

1 - 30

英文

本文在不同的群體規模與捐獻機制下，檢驗實驗對象在有門檻的公共財與共同資源賽局中的合作行為。首先，本文發現決策架構對合作無顯著的主效果，但和群體規模間的交互效果則是顯著的。具體言之，在小群體中實驗對象偏好給勝於不拿，偏好拿取全部勝於完全不給，但在大群體中實驗對象的偏好則恰好相反。此一發現顯示實驗對象在小群體中的行為較為激進，但在大群體中則較為被動。其次，不論是在公共財或共同資源賽局，實驗結果建議連續損獻機制可大幅減輕實驗對象完全免費享用的動機。最後，本文建議在小群體中提供公共財與共同資源是達成柏拉圖效率與極大化社會福利的最有效方法。

This paper examines cooperation in threshold public goods and common resources games by considering different sizes of groups and contribution mechanisms. Our experimental findings show first that framing has no significant main effect on cooperation, while its interaction with group sizes is significant. More specifically, subjects in small groups preferred giving to not-taking and preferred taking-all to giving-nothing, while subjects in large groups by contrast preferred just the opposite. This indicates that subjects acted more aggressively in small groups, while in large groups they behaved rather passively. Secondly, the continuous contribution mechanism greatly alleviated the incentive to completely free ride in both small and large groups, regardless of the frame .Finally, providing public goods and common resources in small groups was the most effective way of achieving the Pareto efficient outcome and maximizing social welfare.

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