题名 |
同質Bertrand 競爭下的最適貿易政策 |
并列篇名 |
Optimal Trade Policy Under Homogenous Bertrand Competition |
DOI |
10.29628/AEP.200303.0002 |
作者 |
楊雅博(Ya-Po Yang);黃鴻(Hong Hwang) |
关键词 |
貿易政策 ; 出口政策 ; Bertrand 競爭 ; Trade policy ; Export policy ; Bertrand competition |
期刊名称 |
經濟論文 |
卷期/出版年月 |
31卷1期(2003 / 03 / 01) |
页次 |
73 - 89 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
根據Brander and Spencer (1985)與Eaton and Grossman (1986)之結果可知:當廠商採Cournot (Bertrand)競爭時,出口國政府應對其出口品補貼(課稅)。上述結果在出口商之產品為同質且採Bertrand競爭時,並不成立。本文發現:當產品為同質且出口商採Bertrand競爭時,出口國政府並沒有誘因對出口課稅;因此,最適貿易政策為自由貿易。 |
英文摘要 |
According to the trade model a la Brander and Spencer (1985) and Eaton and Grossman (1986), a country should subsidize (tax) its export if its firms compete with foreign firms in a third market under Cournot (Bertrand) fashion. This paper shows that this result does not hold under homogenous Bertrand competition. It is found that the optimal export policy becomes free trade if the domestic and foreign firms play in a Bertrand fashion and if their products are homogeneous. |
主题分类 |
社會科學 >
經濟學 |
参考文献 |
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被引用次数 |