When Will the Controlling Shareholder Expropriate Investors? Cash Flow Right and Investment Opportunity Perspectives

何時最終控制股東會剝削其他股東－現金權以及投資機會之觀點

10.29628/AEP.200309.0003

湛可南(Konan Chan)；胡星陽(Shing-yang Hu)；王衍智(Yan-zhi Wang)

公司治理 ； 投資機會 ； Corporate governance ； Investment opportunity

經濟論文

31卷3期（2003 / 09 / 01）

301 - 331

英文

本文主要研究公司最終控制股東之現金權、公司投資機會與公司價值三者之間的關係。在近幾年的研究中發現，控制股東的現金權是影響控制股東是否剝削小股東的重要因素；當現金權越高，公司價值也越高。在本研究中，我們發現公司面對好的投資成長機會時，控制股東傾向不剝削公司價值。然而，如果公司有好的投資計畫，但是控制股東的現金權卻相對的很低，則控制股東仍有剝削公司價值的可能。因此，在一個投資成長機會良好的環境下，控制股東是否剝削公司價值會依據現金權的多寡，有著不同結論。這也同時驗證了公司價值與控制股東現金權之間，存在一個非線形的關係。

In this paper, we examine how investment opportunities influence the impact of cash flow rights on a firm value. Previous papers argue that cash flow rights serve as the incentives of a controlling shareholder to expropriate outside investors, and document that cash flow rights increase firm value. We find that when firms have opportunities to invest in positive NPV projects, cash flow rights do not increase firm value. However, when there exist investment opportunities and cash flow rights are relatively low, cash flow rights still increase firm value. Only when cash flow rights are relatively high, will firm value not be affected by cash flow rights, given the potential investment gains. Hence, in the presence of profitable projects, whether cash flow rights increase firm value depends on the level of cash flow rights. These results suggest a non-linear relationship between cash flow right of the controlling shareholder and firm valuation.

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