Incomplete Contract and Overinvestment

不完全契約與過度投資

10.29628/AEP.200509.0002

紀志毅(Woody Chih-Yi Chi)

不完全契約 ； 合作性投資 ； 資訊不對稱談判 ； Incomplete contract ； Cooperative investment ； Asymmetric information bargaining

經濟論文

33卷3期（2005 / 09 / 01）

303 - 321

英文

在不完全契約的文獻中，投資低於社會最適幾乎是必然的結果。本研究發現，當投資為合作的（如買方所要買的物品，因賣方的投資而有較好的品質），而且在投資後的談判中，買賣雙方所擁有的資訊並不對稱時，不完全契約的環境可能造成過度投資。另外，我們也發現，使用選擇權契約有時能使投資量與交易量都達到最適。

We show that the underinvestment result in the incomplete contract literature relies on the assumption that either the in vestment is selfish, or the bargaining after the investment has been made is under symmetric information, or both. Contract incompleteness might lead to overinvestment when the investment is unobservable and cooperative (the buyer's value of the good depends on the seller's investment), and the players have asymmetric information during the bargaining (the buyer has private in formation regarding his value for the good). We also show that when the investment is observable but not verifiable, using an option contract might be able to restore efficient investment and amount of trade.

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