| 题名 |
包含消費者搜尋的訊息性廣告 |
| 并列篇名 |
Informative Advertising with Consumer Search |
| DOI |
10.29628/AEP.200609.0001 |
| 作者 |
吳芝文(Jollene Z. Wu)；周建富(Chien-Fu Chou) |
| 关键词 |
訊息性廣告 ； 消費者搜尋 ； 獨占性競爭 ； Informative advertising ； Consumer search ； Monopolistic competition |
| 期刊名称 |
經濟論文 |
| 卷期/出版年月 |
34卷3期（2006 / 09 / 01） |
| 页次 |
301 - 323 |
| 内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
| 中文摘要 |
文獻上討論廠商的廣告行為大都忽略消費者自主蒐集訊息的可能。本文將此部分納入考慮，探討獨占性競爭產業廠商的廣告決策。因為加入了消費者的這一項行為，使得許多結果和不存在消費者搜尋的狀況不同。包括：當消費者會主動蒐集訊息時，廠商有可能完全不做廣告；反之，不存在消費者搜尋時，不論市場大小，廠商都一定會作廣告。不存在消費者搜尋時競爭均衡的廣告水準為社會最適；反之，存在消費者搜尋的競爭均衡並非社會最適，廠商的廣告量大少。此外，消費者主動蒐集資訊後是否真的獲得更多的資訊？本文的分析結果是，消費者在短期不一定能獲得更多訊息，在長期則確實因此擁有了更多訊息也提高了效用水準。存在消費者搜尋的市場也會有更多的商品種類出現。 |
| 英文摘要 |
Most of the advertising literature assumes that consumers do not search in an oligopoly market with firms producing heterogeneous products. In this paper we consider the effects of consumer search in an industry equilibrium when firms advertise their products to attract consumers. Starting with a standard Dixit-Stiglitz style monopolistic competition framework, we assume that the demand for the product of a monopolistic firm depends on the number of consumers who are aware of the existence of the firm as well as prices. Firms advertise their products to attract consumers' attention. We investigate two cases. First, the number of firms a consumer knows depends totally on firms' advertising expenditures. In that case, the monopolistic competition equilibrium advertising expenditure of a representative firm is socially optimal, the same as the results in the literature. Then we study the case when consumers engage in search activities to learn of more firms. In this case, firms spend less than the socially optimal level in an industry equilibrium. We also show that in the short run when the number of firms is fixed, consumers do not get more information when doing a search. However, in the long run equilibrium more firms will enter the industry and consumer welfare increases. |
| 主题分类 |
社會科學 >
經濟學 |
| 参考文献 |
|
