题名

反傾銷保護與Byrd修正條款

并列篇名

Antidumping Protection and the Byrd Amendment

DOI

10.29628/AEP.200712.0001

作者

吳世傑(Shih-Jye Wu)

关键词

反傾銷稅 ； 傾銷差額 ； Byrd修正條款 ； Antidumping duty ； Dumping margin ； The Byrd amendment

期刊名称

經濟論文

卷期/出版年月

35卷4期（2007 / 12 / 01）

页次

381 - 410

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

美國2000年公佈的反傾銷法Byrd修正條款規定，通過徵收反傾銷及反補貼關稅所獲得的稅收收入，應再歸補給提出申訴的美國國內相關業者。白於此一條款係將關稅收入撥付給外國出口商的競爭對手，歐盟與一些WTO會員國乃控訴美國藉由此一條款實施不公平的貿易保護手段。令人疑惑的是，最近一些國貿學者的理論研究卻都顯示，Byrd修正條款不僅對進口國廠商有利也同時對出口國廠商有利。顯然的，他們的研究無法解釋為何還有那麼多的國家反對美國實施此一條款。相對的，本文發現相較於傳統的反傾銷法案，Byrd修正條款提供了進口國廠商操作「傾銷事實成立條件」的機會，不但造成外國廠商被課反傾銷稅的機會增加，也同時擴大了反傾銷稅率，因此外國廠商在Byrd修正條款下將受到更大的傷害。
英文摘要

The paper conducts a theoretical analysis of the effect of the Byrd Amendment, which amended the U.S. antidumping law to allow the revenue from antidumping duties imposed on foreign firms to be distributed to domestic import-competing firms that lodged the complaint of dumping. Whereas the Byrd Amendment had been the subject of a dispute between the U.S. and several WTO member countries, many trade theorists paradoxically found the Byrd Amendment can yield lower duties and greater import volume than in its absence, thereby benefitting not only the home firms but also the foreign firms. On the contrary, this paper shows that the Byrd Amendment provides an incentive for domestic firms to adjust sales so as to shift the dumping margin in its favor. The outcome is that the foreign firms are more likely to be found guilty of dumping, and the resultant level of antidumping duty becomes higher after the presence of the Byrd Amendment.
主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
参考文献
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