题名

汽車保險不明車損的誘發性理賠-台灣的實證分析

并列篇名

Induced Claims of Unknown Perils Coverage in Automobile Insurance: Empirical Evidence in Taiwan

DOI

10.29628/AEP.200809.0001

作者

利菊秀(Chu-Shiu Li);彭盛昌(Sheng-Chang Peng);劉純之(Chwen-Chi Liu)

关键词

汽車保險 ; 道德危險 ; 不明車損 ; Automobile insurance ; Moral hazard ; Unknown peril

期刊名称

經濟論文

卷期/出版年月

36卷3期(2008 / 09 / 01)

页次

249 - 275

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

本文以台灣汽車保險車體損失險的甲式保單為對象,驗證誘發性理賠的經濟效果,探討不明車損的保障是否會產生顯著的理賠誘因。研究發現,甲式保單中不明車損的保障,的確含有誘發性理賠的作用,而此現象主要是透過保單到期前一個月之理賠模式來進行。實證結果顯示,保單到期前會以不明車損申請理賠者的特性有:駕駛人的特微與要保人的特微一致、理賠係數較低、理賠後在同一家保險公司的續保率較高,這些都與在其他保單月份之理賠案的現象不同,但都符合誘發性理賠的特性。而理賠動機有可能是消費者利用不明車損浮濫申報,以收回部分保費支出,也可能是累積小額理賠暫不申報,直到期末才一次理賠以避免理賠次數過多影響續保保費。本文的研究,驗證了特定項目的保障可能引發負面的動機效果之事實。

英文摘要

This paper tests the economic effect of unknown perils coverage in automobile insurance on claim behavior in Taiwan. In terms of filing claims in the last month before contracts expire, the insured are found to overuse the insurance coverage of unknown perils. The empirical evidence reveals that some characteristics of the claimants who file the claims in the last policy month are different from that of those who file claims in the alternative months. As a special insurance contract is permitted to reimburse the insured with the claimed loss without requiring any verification, unknown perils coverage does create significant incentive to file excessive claims at the end of policy period.

主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
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被引用次数
  1. 劉純之,彭盛昌,利菊秀(2019)。台灣汽車保險風險分類之實證分析。經濟論文,47(2),297-338。
  2. 劉純之、林志豪、利菊秀(2010)。風險分類與道德風險—汽車保險未限定駕駛人保單的損失評估。經濟論文,38(4),619-659。
  3. 謝淑慧、劉俊廷、何佳玲(2012)。重置成本保險與道德危險─台灣汽車竊盜損失險實證分析。經濟論文,40(1),1-33。