Government Relief as a Partial Insurance for the Individual's Background Risk

政府救助為個人背景風險之保險

黃瑞卿(Rachel J. Huang)

Government intervention ； Background risk ； Government relief ； 政府干預 ； 所得背景風險 ； 政府救助

經濟論文

39卷1期（2011 / 03 / 01）

33 - 59

英文

This paper discusses whether governments should intervene in the private insurance market by providing income-related relief when the individual faces an insurable risk and an independent uninsurable background income risk. It is found that the government's relief may not totally crowd out the private insurance market, and that the government could improve social welfare if it provides additional coverage against the insurable risk only when the individuals are in a low income state. This income-related government relief could serve as a partial hedge for the individual's background risk.

本篇論文討論當個人面對獨立的所得背景風險時，政府是否應提供救助。論文發現政府若提供與所得水準相關的救助系統，則此種救助不一定會具有排擠效果，使得個人減少對私人保險之購買。同時，此種系統具有保險的功能，可使個人移轉部分所得背景風險，並提高社會福利。

1. Aase, K. K.(1990).Unemployment Insurance and Incentives.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,15,141-157.
2. Akerlof, G.(1970).The Market for Lemons: Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism.Quarterly Journal of Economics,74,488-500.
3. Battocchio, P.,Menoncin, F.(2004).Optimal Pension Management in a Stochastic Framework.Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,34,79-96.
4. Blomqvist, A.,Johansson, P. O.(1997).Economic Efficiency and Mixed Public/Private Insurance.Journal of Public Economics,66,505-516.
5. Brown, J. R.(2003).Redistribution and Insurance: Mandatory Annuitization with Mortality Heterogeneity.Journal of Risk and Insurance,70,17-41.
6. Coronado, J. L.,Fullerton, D.,Glass, T.(2000).The Progressivity of Social Security.NBER Working Paper,7520
7. Cremer, H.,Pestieau, P.(1996).Redistributive Taxation and Social Insurance.International Tax and Public Finance,3,281-295.
8. Dana, R.,Scarsini, M.(2007).Optimal Risk Sharing with Background Risk.Journal of Economic Theory,133,151-176.
9. Diamond, P. A.(1992).Organizing the Health Insurance Market.Econometrica,60,1233-1254.
10. Dionne, G.(ed.)(2000).Handbook of Insurance.Boston, MA:Kluwer Academic Publishers.
11. Dionne, G.(ed.)(1992).Contributions to Insurance Economics.Boston, MA:Kluwer Academic Publishers.
12. Doherty, N. A.,Eeckhoudt, L.(1995).Optimal Insurance without Expected Utility: The Dual Theory and the Linearity of Insurance Contracts.Journal of Risk and Uncertainty,10,157-179.
13. Doherty, N. A.,Schlesinger, H.(1983).Optimal Insurance in Incomplete Markets.Journal of Political Economy,91,1045-1054.
14. Doherty, N. A.,Schlesinger, H.(1983).The Optimal Deductible for an Insurance Policy When Initial Wealth Is Random.Journal of Business,56,555-565.
15. Eckstein, Z.,Eichenbaum, M.,Peled, D.(1985).Uncertain Lifetimes and the Welfare Enhancing Properties of Annuity Markets and Social Security.Journal of Public Economics,26,303-326.
16. Eeckhoudt, L.,Gollier, C.,Schlesinger, H.(1996).Changes in Background Risk and Risk Taking Behavior.Econometrica,64,683-689.
17. Eichner, T.,Wagener, A.(2003).Variance Vulnerability, Background Risks, and Mean-Variance Preferences.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,28,173-184.
18. Feldstein, M.(ed.)(1998).Privatizing Social Security.Chicago, IL:University of Chicago Press.
19. Franke, G.,Stapleton, R. C., Subrahmanyam, M. G.(2004).Background Risk and the Demand for State-Contingent Claims.Economic Theory,23,321-335.
20. Gollier, C.(1996).Optimum Insurance of Approximate Losses.Journal of Risk and Insurance,63,369-380.
21. Gollier, C.,Pratt, J. W.(1996).Risk Vulnerability and the Tempering Effect of Background Risk.Econometrica,64,1109-1123.
22. Golosov, M.,Tsyvinski, A.(2006).Designing Optimal Disability Insurance: A Case for Asset Testing.Journal of Political Economy,114,257-279.
23. Guiso, L.,Jappelli, T.(1998).Background Uncertainty and the Demand for Insurance Against Insurable Risk.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,23,7-27.
24. Gustman, A. L.,Steinmeier, T. L.(2001).How Effective Is Redistribution under the Social Security Benefit Formula?.Journal of Public Economics,82,1-28.
25. Huang, R. J.,Tsai, J. T.,Tzeng, L. Y.(2008).Government-Provided Annuities under Insolvency Risk.Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,43,377-385.
26. Huang, R. J.,Tzeng, L. Y.(2007).Insurer's Insolvency Risk and Tax Deductions for the Individual's Net Losses.Geneva Risk and Insurance Review,32,129-145.
27. Jeleva, M.(2000).Background Risk, Demand for Insurance, and Choquet Expected Utility Preferences.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,25,7-28.
28. Kaplow, L.(1992).Government Relief for Risk Associated with Government Action.Scandinavian Journal of Economics,94,525-541.
29. Kaplow, L.(1992).Income Tax Deductions for Losses as Insurance.American Economic Review,82,1013-1017.
30. Keenan, D. C.,Snow, A.(2003).Locally Greater Vulnerability to Background Risk.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,28,161-172.
31. Koeniger, W.(2004).Labor Income Risk and Car Insurance in the UK.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,29,55-74.
32. Liebman, J.(2002).Redistribution in the Current U.S. Social Security System.Distributional Aspects of Social Security and Social Security Reform,Chicago, IL:
33. Mayers, D.,Smith, C.(1983).The Interdependence of Individual Portfolio Decisions and the Demand for Insurance.Journal of Political Economy,91,304-311.
34. Menoncin, F.(2002).Optimal Portfolio and Background Risk: An Exact and an Approximated Solution.Insurance: Mathematics and Economics,31,249-266.
35. Meyer, D. J.,Meyer, J.(1998).Changes in Background Risk and the Demand for Insurance.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,23,29-40.
36. Mossin, J.(1968).Aspects of Rational Insurance Purchasing.Journal of Political Economy,76,553-568.
37. Pavoni, N.(2007).On Optimal Unemployment Compensation.Journal of Monetary Economics,54,1612-1630.
38. Rochet, J. C.(1991).Incentives, Redistribution and Social Insurance.Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory,16,143-165.
39. Schlesinger, H.(1997).Insurance Demand without the Expected-Utility Paradigm.Journal of Risk and Insurance,64,19-39.
40. Selden, T.(1993).Should the Government Provide Catastrophic Insurance?.Journal of Public Economics,51,241-247.
41. Vercammen, V.(2001).Optimal Insurance with Nonseparable Background Risk.Journal of Risk and Insurance,68,437-448.
42. Wang, C.,Williamson, S. D.(2002).Moral Hazard, Optimal Unemployment Insurance, and Experience Rating.Journal of Monetary Economics,49,1337-1371.

1. 黃瑞卿,曾郁仁,陳姿穎(2021)。Insurance-Linked Lotto。經濟論文，49(3)，321-362。