所得差距、經濟整合與 FDI

Income Disparity, Economic Integration and FDI

10.29628/AEP.201112.0004

劉亮君(Liang-Jing Liu)；林燕淑(Yan-Shu Lin)；黃鴻(Hong Hwang)

所得差距 ； 經濟整合 ； FDI ； 社會福利 ； Income disparity ； Economic integration ； FDI ； Social welfare

經濟論文

39卷4期（2011 / 12 / 01）

473 - 497

繁體中文

許多WTO的會員國都在WTO的架構下進行經濟整合。這些國家不論是已開發或是未開發都希望透過經濟整合來降低彼此的貿易障礙，進而提高經濟資源的有效分配，以及參與國之福祉。本文分析當整合中的兩個國家存在所得差異時，經濟整合會如何影響其社會福利及外人直接投資（FDI）。本文得到以下結論：當被投資國政府不對FDI採課稅或補貼政策時：（1）高所得國會吸引較多之FDI廠商； （2）隨兩國之所得差異增加時，到高（低）所得國家之廠商數會增加（減少）； （3）貿易成本對FDI沒有影響。當被投資國政府對FDI採定額課稅或補貼政策時：（1）在貿易成本很小（大）時，政府會採課稅（補貼）政策；（2）低所得國家的均衡廠商數會大於高所得國，且隨整合程度提高，到高（低）所得國家之廠商數會減少（增加）；（3）經濟整合對兩國之福利皆為有利的。

Many members of the WTO, including developed and non-developed countries, have engaged in economic integration under the framework of the WTO to reduce trade barriers and to improve the efficiency of resource distribution and welfare. In the present study, we utilize a generalized oligopoly model to analyze how economic integration between two countries with income disparity affects their welfare and FDI, and have reached the following conclusions. If the governments of the two countries do not impose any tax or subsidy policy on FDI, (1) the country with higher income will attract more FDI; (2) the magnitude of the FDI is positively related to the income disparity; (3) the FDIs will not be affected by the trade cost. On the other hand, if the two governments impose taxes or subsidies on FDI, (1) the governments will levy taxes (subsidies) on FDI if the trade cost is small (large); (2) FDI to the low-income country is higher than that to the high-income country, and the difference in FDIs increases with the integration; (3) both countries are better off after economic integration.

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