替代品還是互補品？汽車車體損失險與任意汽車第三人責任險的關係探究

Substitutes or Complements? The Interaction between Automobile Physical Damage Insurance and Voluntary Liability Insurance

彭盛昌(Sheng-Chang Peng)；利菊秀(Chu-Shiu Li)；劉純之(Chwen-Chi Liu)

替代品 ； 互補品 ； 汽車車體損失險 ； 任意汽車責任險 ； 搭售訂價 ； Substitutes ； Complements ； Automobile physical damage insurance ； Voluntary liability insurance ； Bundling pricing

經濟論文

42卷2期（2014 / 06 / 01）

145 - 172

繁體中文

對消費者而言，汽車車體損失險與任意汽車第三人責任險是兩種完全不同保障範圍的險種。但是，一般分析汽車保險的文獻很少討論兩者的關係，也不在意其間的區別。本文以購買新車的消費者為對象，利用兩個保單年度的縱橫資料，分析消費者同時面對汽車車體損失與第三人損失的保險保障選擇。研究發現，保單持有人在第二年的購買組合若有改變，會顯著的受到第一年購買組合的影響。特別的是，保單持有人會以兩種險種互為替代或互補的方式，調整下一期購買組合，以達到潛在的均衡。而汽車保險組合之間的替代性，提供了保險公司以搭售方式來訂價與銷售的新思維。

For consumers, vehicle damage insurance and liability insurance are completely different regarding the objects they cover. However, there is little research associated with the purchasing relationship between these two types of insurance. Thus, this paper examines the behavior of new car owners who purchase two seemingly related automobile insurance policies that cover the first party (automobile physical damage insurance) and third party (voluntary third-party liability insurance) using a panel data set of two policy years. The results indicate that for policyholders who are likely to adjust their coverage, current portfolios of two types of automobile insurance significantly affect their insurance portfolios in the following policy year. In fact, customers purchase the two kinds of automobile insurance policies as substitutes or complements to realize equilibrium potentials. The results suggest that insurers can consider optional bundle pricing strategies.

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