Government Transaction Policy, Inflation, and Unemployment

政府交易策略、通貨膨脹與失業

張德存(Te-Tsun Chang)

菲利普曲線 ； 政府交易 ； 政府規模 ； Phillips curve ； Government transaction ； Size of government

經濟論文

43卷3期（2015 / 09 / 01）

317 - 343

英文

本文以一具個體基礎的模型探討政府交易策略與政府規模如何影響長期菲力普曲線。公僕在商品市場買賣，並與私部門人員有同樣的限制式與技術;但是他們可以自己決定交易策略。而政府交易策略將影響氏眾的誘風模型均衡與菲力普曲線的斜率。若公僕遵照市場價量交易事其存在可以減少市場的交易摩擦，進而誘使廠商多聘雇勞工。足夠大的政府規模將會刪除掉複均衡中失業率較高的均衡。此外事若政府規模越大事我們可能會得到負斜率的菲力普曲線。然而今若公僕採府不買就拉倒的交易策略，我們會得到反向的政府效果今使失業率越高。

This study examines how the size of government and government transaction policies affect the long-run relationship between inflation and unemployment in a search-theoretic framework with explicit microfoundations. Government agents, subject to the same matching technology and other constraints as private agents, are sellers and buyers in the goods market and behave exogenously regarding terms of trade. I show that public agents' transaction policies can change the private agents' incentives, the set of equilibria, and the slope of the Phillips curve. If their terms of trade resemble those of private agents, government agents ameliorate trade frictions for households and firms, thus inducing firms to hire workers. Higher inflation, and thus lower real money balances, discourage firms from hiring workers because a decrease in profits ensues. Thus, higher inflation accompanied by a larger government might induce a lower unemployment rate. If there are multiple equilibria, a sufficiently large government might eliminate the equilibrium accompanied by a high unemployment rate. However, a larger size of government induces a higher unemployment rate if a government agent makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to a firm and a household. Then, the effect of government moves in the opposite direction.

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1. 陳妍蒨,張德存,林佑龍(2020)。資產流動性、失業與貨幣政策。經濟論文叢刊，48(1)，107-136。
2. 張德存(2023)。公部門聘僱、貨幣政策與失業。經濟論文，51(1)，85-116。