题名

利益團體、民營化與關稅政策

并列篇名

INTEREST GROUPS, PRIVATIZATION AND TARIFF POLICY

作者

彭朋義(Peng-Yi Peng);顏志達(Chih-Ta Yen);吳朝欽(Tsaur-Chin Wu)

关键词

利益團體 ; 民營化 ; 關稅 ; Interest groups ; Privatization ; Tariff

期刊名称

經濟論文

卷期/出版年月

46卷1期(2018 / 03 / 01)

页次

99 - 132

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

本文考量經濟體系存在的政治失靈現象,將利益團體對政府提供政治獻金並進行遊説的行為,導入政府決定民營化與關稅政策架構中,檢視在此設定下的最適釋股比例與關稅政策,以及對社會福利水準的影響。文中發現:存在利益團體的遊説行為時,會使得政府制訂較高的釋股比例、較低的關稅稅率(甚或補貼)政策;其次,相較於不存在利益團體遊説行為而言,存在利益團體對本國政府提供政治獻金進行遊説行為,反而會讓本國社會福利水準提高,並對兩國社會福利水準有著柏拉圖改善(Pareto improvement)效果;其三,本文延伸探討兩國簽訂與未簽訂自由貿易協定的情況,指出兩國總和福利水準的高低,取決於利益團體的遊説效率;最後,就Wang and Chiou (2015)所認為民營化與關稅政策的等價性性質,在本文的分析架構下,則有著相異的論點。

英文摘要

This paper incorporates the political contribution and lobbying activities of interest groups into governments' decisions on privatization and tariff polices. Under this condition of government failure, we re-examine the optimal privatization and tariff policy, as well as their impact on social welfare. First, it is found that the optimal level of privatization will be higher and tariff will be lower (or even subsidy in some cases) whenever lobbying exists. Second, the domestic welfare will be higher under political contribution than that without, and produces Pareto improvement for both countries. Moreover, to extend the situation of trading countries with or without a Free Trade Agreement, we find that the changing direction of aggregate welfare depends on the efficiency of lobbying. Finally, the equivalence between privatization and tariff policies of Wang and Chiou (2015) will not hold under our framework.

主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
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被引用次数
  1. 許韶芳,翁堃嵐,呂俊慧(2020)。商品不可分割性與最適商品稅兼論利益團體遊說的情況。經濟論文,48(4),557-587。
  2. 黃芳玫、林柏翰(2018)。台灣公營事業民營化對受僱員工薪資與就業之影響─長期追蹤資料分析。經濟論文,46(2),185-223。
  3. 梁文榮,周冰瑤,王光正(2020)。Comparing Specific and Ad Valorem Taxes under Price����Inelastic Demand with Quality Differentiation。經濟論文,48(2),183-216。