题名

不確定性、高階經理人報償差距與公司績效之關連性：競賽理論之驗證

并列篇名

Relationships among Uncertainty, Top Management Pay Gap and Firm Performance: A Tale of Tournament Theory

DOI

10.6552/JOAR.2006.42.2

作者

李佳玲(Chia-Ling Lee)

关键词

競賽理論 ； 報償差距 ； 不確定性 ； 績效 ； Tournament theory ； Pay gap ； Uncertainty ； Performance

期刊名称

會計評論

卷期/出版年月

42期（2006 / 01 / 01）

页次

23 - 53

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

競賽理論主張隨著監督困難性增加，高階經理人的報償差距可減少耗費成本的監督，並提供高階經理人與股東利益相符之誘因。當公司不確定性越高時，監督越困難，根據競賽理論預測隨著公司不確定性越高，高階經理人的報償差距應越大，即愈會發現高階經理人與下一層級經理人報償差距愈大，且公司不確定性與高階經理人報償差距之配合可改善公司績效。公司風險與盈餘雜訊均被認為代表公司不確定性，本文以風險與盈餘雜訊來代表不確定性，運用台灣上市上櫃公司之資料來驗證競賽理論，探討當公司風險或會計盈餘雜訊越高時，高階經理人報償差距是否愈大？結合公司不確定性與報償差距是否有助於公司的績效？本文實證結果可支持競賽理論之大部分預測。
英文摘要

Tournament theory asserts that top management pay gaps reduce the need of costly supervision and provides the incentive alignment of CEO and shareholders as monitoring become tougher. Monitoring is particularly difficult in uncertain environments. Based on the tournament theory, this paper predicts that top management pay gaps will be greater in firms with higher uncertainty. That is, the phenomenon that the larger pay gap exists between firm's CEO and its other top executive is more. Furthermore, the combination of higher uncertainty and greater top management pay gaps will enhance firm performance. Such uncertainty is also known as firm risk and noise in earnings. This paper considered these two different types of uncertainty. Using the research samples of firms listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and OTC stock exchange, this paper used the tournament theory to test whether top management pay gaps are greater in higher uncertain environments. Does the combination of higher uncertainty and greater top management pay gaps enhance firm performance? Most of the predictions of tournament theories can be supported by empirical results in this study.
主题分类 社會科學 > 財金及會計學
参考文献
  1. 陳明園、石雅慧(2004)。高階經理人薪酬－代理理論與競賽理論之實證研究。台大管理論叢，15(1)，131-166。
    連結：
  2. 單驥、吳玉瑩(2004)。台灣管理階層薪資結構：Tournament Theory之實證研究。管理評論，23(2)，47-68。
    連結：
  3. Anthony, J. H.,K. R. Petroni.(1997).Accounting estimation disclosures and firm valuation in the property-casualty insurance industry.Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance,12(3),127-281.
  4. Antle, R.,A. Smith.(1986).An empirical investigation of the relative performance evaluation of corporate executives.Journal of Accounting Research,24,1-39.
  5. Baber, W. R.,S. Janakiraman,S. Kang.(1996).Investment opportunities and the structure of executive compensation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,21(3),297-318.
  6. Baber, W. R.,Sok-Hyon Kang,K. R. Kumar.(1999).The explanatory power of earnings levels vs. earnings changes in the context of executive compensation.The Accounting Review,74(4),459-472.
  7. Baysinger, B. D.,R. D. Kosnick,T. A. Turk.(1991).Effects of board and ownership structure on corporate R&D strategy.Academy of Management Journal,34,205-214.
  8. Becker, B. E.,M. A. Huselid.(1992).The incentive effects of tournament compensation systems.Administrative Science Quarterly,37,336-350.
  9. Bloom, M.(1999).The performance effects of pay dispersion on individuals and organizations.Academy of Management Journal,42(1),25-40.
  10. Bloom, M.,G. T. Milkovich.(1998).Relationships among risk, incentive pay, and organizational performance.Academy of Management Journal,41(3),283-297.
  11. Budde, J.(1999).Variance analysis as an incentive device when payments are based on rank order.Management Accounting Research,10,5-19.
  12. Bushee, B.(1998).The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior.The Accounting Review,73,305-333.
  13. Bushman, R. M.,R. J. Indjejikian,A. Smith.(1996).CEO compensation: the role of individual performance evaluation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,21,161-193.
  14. Working paper
  15. Carpenter, M. A.,W. M. Gerard Sanders.(2002).Top management team compensation: the missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?.Strategic Management Journal,23,367-375.
  16. Christensen, T. E.(2002).The effects of uncertainty on the informativeness of earnings: evidence from the insurance industry in the wake of catastrophic events.Journal of Business Finance Accounting,29,223-255.
  17. Clinch, G.(1991).Employee compensation and firms' research and development activity.Journal of Accounting Research,29,59-78.
  18. Coff, R.(1997).Human assets and management dilemmas: coping with hazards on the road to resource-based theory.Academy of Management Review,22,374-402.
  19. DeFond M. L.,C. W. Park.(1999).The effect of competition on CEO turnover.Journal of Accounting and Economics,27,35-56.
  20. Demsetz, H.,K. Lehn.(1985).The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences.Journal of Political Economy,93,1155-1177.
  21. Drake, A. R.,S. F. Haka,S. P. Ravenscroft.(1999).Cost system and incentive structure effects on innovation, efficiency and profitability in teams.Accounting Review,74(3),323-345.
  22. Dyl, E. A.(1988).Corporate control and management compensation evidence on the agency problem.Managerial and Decision Economics,9,21-25.
  23. Ehrenberg, R.,M. Bognanno.(1990).The incentive effects of tournaments revisited: evidence from the European PGA tour.Industrial and Labor Relations Review,43,74-88.
  24. Eisenhardt, K. M.(1989).Agency - and institutional-theory explanations: the case of retail sales compensation.Academy of Management Review,14,57-74.
  25. Eisenhardt, K. M.(1985).Control: organizational and economic approaches.Management Science,31,34-149.
  26. Engel E.,R. M. Hayes,X. Wang.(2003).CEO turnover and properties of accounting information.Journal of Accounting and Economics,36,275-292.
  27. Eriksson, T.(1999).Executive compensation and tournament theory: empirical tests on Danish data.Journal of Labor Economics,17,262-280.
  28. Finkelstein, S.,B. K. Boyd.(1998).Market comparison earnings and the bidding-up of executive cash compensation: evidence from the United Kingdom.Academy of Management Journal,41(2),221-231.
  29. Finkelstein, S.,D. C. Hambrick.(1996).Top executives and their effects on organizations.Minneapolis-St. Paul:West.
  30. Gibbons, R.,K. J. Murphy.(1990).Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers.Industrial and Labor Relations Review,43(3),30-51.
  31. Gomez-Mejia, L. R.,H. Tosi,T. Hinkin.(1987).Managerial control, performance, and executive compensation.Academy of Management Journal,30,51-70.
  32. Graham, J. R.(1999).Herding among investment newsletters: theory and evidence.Journal of Finance,59,237-269.
  33. Graves, S. B.,N. S. Langowitz.(1993).Innovative productivity and returns to scale in the pharmaceutical industry.Strategic Management Journal,14,593-605.
  34. Gray, S. R.,A. A. Cannella.(1997).The role of risk in executive compensation.Journal of Management,23(4),217-540.
  35. Hambrick, D. C.,P. A. Siegel.(1997).Pay dispersion within top management groups: harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms.Academy of Management Proceedings,26-30.
  36. Henderson, A. D.,J. W. Fredrickson.(2001).Top management coordination needs and the CEO pay gap: a competitive test of economic and behavioral views.Academy of Management Journal,44(1),96-117.
  37. Henley, A.,A. Carruth,A. Dickerson.(2003).Industry-wide versus firm-specific uncertainty and investment: British company panel data evidence.Economics Letters,78,89-92.
  38. Holmström, B.(1982).Moral hazard in teams.Bell Journal of Economics,13,324-340.
  39. Jacobs, M.(1991).Short-term America: the causes and cures of our business myopia.Boston, MA:Harvard Business Press.
  40. Jensen, M. C.,K. J. Murphy.(1990).Performance, pay, and top management incentives.Journal of Political Economy,3,305-350.
  41. Jensen, M. C.,K. J. Murphy.(1987).Working Paper 86-14Working Paper 86-14,University of Rochester Managerial Economics Research Center.
  42. Kren, L.,J. L. Kerr.(1993).The effect of behavior monitoring and uncertainty on the use of performance-contingent compensation.Accounting and Business Research,23,159-168.
  43. Lambert, R. A.,D. F. Larcker.(1987).An analysis of the use of accounting and market measures of performance in executive compensation contracts.Journal of Accounting Research,25,85-129.
  44. Lambert, R.,D. Larcker,K. Weigelt.(1993).The structure of organizational incentives.Administrative Science Quarterly,38,438-461.
  45. Lazear, E.,S. Rosen.(1981).Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts.Journal of Political Economy,89,841-864.
  46. Lee, C.M.C.,B. Swaminathan.(2000).Bad news travels slowly: size, analyst coverage, and the profitability of momentum strategies.Journal of Finance,55,265-294.
  47. Leonard, J.(1990).Executive pay and firm performance.Industrial and Labor Relations Review,43,13-29.
  48. Main, B.,C. III O''Reilly,J. Wade.(1993).Top executive pay: tournament or teamwork?.Journal of Labor Economics,11,606-628.
  49. Miller, D.,J. Shamsie.(1996).The resource-based view of the firm in two environments: the Hollywood film studios from 1936 to 1965.Academy of Management Journal,39,519-543.
  50. Miller, J. S.,R. M. Wiseman,L. R. Gomez-Mejia.(2002).The fit between CEO compensation design and firm risk.Academy of Management Journal,45(4),745-756.
  51. Murphy, K. J.(2000).Performance standards in incentive contracts.Journal of Accounting and Economics,30,245-278.
  52. O''Reilly, C. III,B. Main,G. Crystal.(1988).CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison: a tale of two theories.Administrative Science Quarterly,33,257-274.
  53. Paulo, S.(2002).Operating income, residual income and EVA: which metric is more value relevant-a comment.Journal of Managerial Issues,14(4),500-506.
  54. Pfeffer, J.,N. Langton.(1993).The effect of wage dispersion on satisfaction, productivity, and working collaboratively: evidence from college and university faculty.Administrative Science Quarterly,38,382-407.
  55. Porter, M.(1992).Capital choices: changing the way America invests in industry.Boston, MA:Harvard Business School.
  56. Prendergast, C.(2002).The tenuous trade-off risk and incentive.Journal of Political Economy,110(5),1071-1102.
  57. Rosen, S.(1986).Prizes, and incentives in elimination tournaments.American Economic Review,76,701-715.
  58. Ryan, H. E.,R. A. Wiggins, III.(2002).The interactions between R&D: investment decisions and compensation policy.Financial Management,31(1),5-29.
  59. Sayre, T. L.,F. W. Rankin,N. L. Fargher.(1998).The effects of promotion incentives on delegated investment decisions: a note.Journal of Management Accounting Research,10,313-323.
  60. Sharpe, W. F.(1964).Capital asset prices: a theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk.Journal of Finance,19,425-442.
  61. Sloan, R.(1993).Accounting earnings and top executive compensation.Journal of Accounting and Economics,16,56-100.
  62. Smith, C. W.,R. L. Watts.(1992).The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies.Journal of Financial Economics,24,263-292.
  63. Teece, D.,G. Pisano,A. Shuen.(1997).Dynamic capabilities and strategic management.Strategic Management Journal,18,509-533.
  64. White, H.(1980).A heteroscedastic-consistent covariance matrix and a direct test for heteroscedasticity.Econometrica,48,421-448.
被引用次数
  1. Lin, Hsiao-Lun,Huang, Chao-Hsin,Duh, Rong-Ruey(2014).Management Accounting Research in Taiwan: A Review and Assessment.會計評論,58,39-99.
  2. Lin, Y. C. George,Lee, Chia-Ling,Chuang, Ya-Hsueh(2007).Performance Consequences of Pay Dispersion within Top Management Teams: The Impact of Firm Collaboration Needs.會計評論,45(特刊),121-149.
  3. 蔡宜伶、李佳玲、史雅男(2011)。總經理薪酬與績效衡量及不確定性之配適度對公司營運績效的影響。組織與管理，4(2)，39-77。
  4. 陳昭蓉、許崇源(2008)。員工分紅、公司治理與未來績效。中山管理評論，16(4)，671-701。
  5. 戴怡蕙,曾智揚(2019)。高階經營團隊的私有資訊分享功能對其當期薪酬與前期績效關聯性影響。管理與系統，26(2)，209-239。
  6. 戴怡蕙,王盈傑(2020)。The Effect of Risk in the Choosing between Stock Options or Restricted Stock Rewards。中華會計學刊，16(2)，259-295。
  7. 董珮珊、林佳慶(2017)。臺灣的銀行高階經理人薪酬之研究。兩岸金融季刊，5(1)，43-67。
  8. 黃美珠、陳玉麟(2009)。薪酬與生產技術效率的解釋：性別與層級在台灣會計師產業扮演的角色。當代會計，10(2)，163-188。
  9. 李伶珠(2013)。客觀與主觀績效對中階經理人升遷之影響。管理學報，30(1)，1-20。
  10. (2008)。智慧資本對公司股價之影響—以台灣高科技產業為例。朝陽商管評論，7(1)，89-117。
  11. (2018)。高階經理人權力與薪酬差距對創新與經營績效之影響：以台灣電子業為例。產業與管理論壇，20(4)，1-10。
print cancel