未費用化薪酬與超額薪酬對高階管理當局薪酬揭露之影響

The Effect of Unexpensed Compensation and Abnormal Compensation on the Disclosures of Top Management's Compensation

10.6552/JOAR.2010.50.4

陳俊合(Chun-Ho Chen)

資訊揭露 ； 高階主管薪酬 ； 員工紅利 ； 董監酬勞 ； Disclosure ； Top executives' compensation ； Employee bonuses ； Directors' and supervisors' remuneration

會計評論

50期（2010 / 01 / 01）

89 - 113

繁體中文

本文欲檢視國內特有的未費用化薪酬以及估計超額薪酬對高階管理當局薪酬揭露政策之影響，並分別針對薪酬揭露是否遵循法令規定與薪酬揭露透明度等級加以探討。本文實證結果顯示，當未費用化薪酬越高以及估計超額薪酬越高時，則其高階管理當局薪酬揭露顯著地較不會遵循法令規定。此外，本文亦發現當未費用化薪酬越高以及估計超額薪酬越高時，則其高階管理當局的薪酬揭露透明度等級顯著較低。綜而言之，本文結果提供一個特殊的證據，即未費用化薪酬與超額薪酬會顯著地影響到高階管理當局之薪酬揭露政策。

This paper investigates how unexpensed compensation and estimated abnormal compensation affect the disclosure policies of the top management's compensation. In this study, the compensation disclosure policies are examined through the status of regulatory compliance and the degrees of transparency. The results show that firms with greater unexpensed and estimated abnormal compensation are less motivated to comply with compensation disclosure rules. In addition, the results also indicate that the disclosure transparency of the top management's compensation of these firms is lower. Overall, the results provide special evidence of the effect of unexpensed and abnormal compensation on the disclosure policy of the top management's compensation.

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