题名

穩健會計對員工分紅之影響

并列篇名

The Effect of Accounting Conservatism on Bonus to Employees

DOI

10.6552/JOAR.2012.55.2

作者

林宛瑩(Wan-Ying Lin)；許崇源(Chung-Yuan Hsu)；戚務君(Wu-Chun Chi)；潘虹華(Hung-Hua Pan)

关键词

員工分紅盈餘貢獻度 ； 穩健會計 ； 董事會特性 ； 稀釋效果 ； Earnings-bonus contribution multiple ； Accounting conservatism ； Corporate governance ； Dilutive effect

期刊名称

會計評論

卷期/出版年月

55期（2012 / 07 / 01）

页次

37 - 75

内容语文

繁體中文
中文摘要

本文探討穩健會計與董事會特性對企業員工分紅決策之影響。我們首先推導模型，並以「員工分紅前之會計淨利」除以「員工紅利」作為被解釋變數，該變數代表員工分紅比率之倒數，本文稱為「員工分紅盈餘貢獻度」。實證結果顯示，在其它條件不變的情況下，由於穩健原則認列收益較嚴謹的特性，使得員工分紅貢獻度與會計穩健程度呈現負向關係。會計較穩健之公司，其員工分紅比率較高。此外，在控制會計穩健性下，我們發現出任董事之經理人持股比率與員工分紅貢獻度呈顯著負向關係。換言之，無論會計屬性或董事會屬性均能系統性地解釋員工分紅貢獻度。具體而言，本研究之意涵為未來針對員工分紅的討論，應將穩健會計水準納入考量。
英文摘要

This study investigates the effect of accounting conservatism and characteristics of corporate board on employee bonus decision. An analytical model is first developed, and a measure of earnings-bonus contribution multiple (i.e., earnings before employee bonus divided by employee bonus) is then derived and examined as our dependent variable. The empirical results indicate that accounting conservatism is significantly and negatively related to earnings-bonus contribution multiple due to the asymmetric treatment of conservatism in more timely recognition of unrealized losses but not to unrealized income. With respect to shareholdings by managers, the result shows that higher the shareholdings lower the earnings-bonus contribution multiple. The findings therefore suggest that both accounting conservatism and the equity ownership of managers who sit on the corporate board can systematically explain the variation in earnings-bonus contribution multiples. The evidence also implies that accounting conservatism should be considered in future studies analyzing employee bonus.
主题分类 社會科學 > 財金及會計學
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被引用次数
  1. 陳俊宏、林家緯(2014)。會計穩健原則與設計薪酬制度之關聯研究。會計學報，5(2)，29-45。
  2. 陳以林,王泰昌(2023)。員工分紅費用化對研發支出之限制效應與對研發效率之影響。管理學報，40(4)，383-416。
  3. 陳昭蓉、許崇源(2014)。穩健會計與員工認股權。會計評論，59，37-72。
  4. 劉嘉雯、陳漢鐘、許文馨、林修葳、王泰昌(2017)。會計穩健性：基於亞洲國家資料研究之回顧。臺大管理論叢，27(4)，207-254。
  5. 蘇靖雅,黃馨儀,陳俊宏,張彥霏,邱采縈,池昱君(2019)。家族企業抑或非家族企業代理人與穩健性的關係分析之研究。會計與公司治理，14(1)，1-21。
  6. 詹凌菁、彭火樹、郭翠菱、吳安妮(2016)。臺灣會計領域研究之回顧與展望。管理學報，33(1)，139-187。
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