穩健會計與員工認股權

Accounting Conservatism and Employee Stock Option

10.6552/JOAR.2014.59.2

陳昭蓉(Chao-Jung Chen)；許崇源(Chung-Yuan Hsu)

穩健會計 ； 員工認股權 ； 會計資訊 ； Accounting Conservatism ； Stock Option ； Accounting Information

會計評論

59期（2014 / 07 / 01）

37 - 72

繁體中文

從2008年初開始，台灣企業給與員工之紅利與認股權，其會計處理改按公允價值費用化，但規範員工認股權會計處理之財務會計準則公報第39號，卻容許企業於該公報（含草案）對外發布到2007年底過渡期間所發行之員工認股權，於2008年後仍不需按公允價值費用化，導致企業在此期間發放之員工認股權較過去大幅增加，其決定因素與資本市場之反映為何，值得探討。本文探討公司會計穩健程度與2007年第39號公報過渡期間發放員工認股權之相關性與市場反應。實證結果發現，當公司穩健程度愈高時，愈不會在2007年發放員工認股權。我們也發現市場投資人對於利用2007年過渡期間發放員工認股權且穩健程度較低的公司之評價較低，但對會計穩健程度較高的公司，即使於過渡期間發放認股權，市場仍給予較高評價，顯見資本市場對會計資訊穩健處理之公司與認股權之員工福利制度持正面評價。

Beginning from January 1, 2008, all companies in Taiwan are required to expense employee stock compensation using the fair value approach. However, for employee stock options granted during the transition period from the publication date of the exposure draft of Taiwan FAS39 to December 31, 2007, the government exempted those options from expensing, which increases a surge of option grants during the period. It is still unclear about the factors that may drive companies to take advantage of the transition period, and how market reacts to such behaviors. This paper examines whether the level of accounting conservatism is negatively associated with such opportunistic behaviors. Empirical results show that as a firm's financial reporting gets more conservative, it is less likely that the firms took advantage of the exemption during the transition period. The results also show that among those firms issuing employee stock option during the transition period, market value is much higher for firms having higher level of accounting conservatism than lower level of conservatism. The results suggest that capital market rewards favorably to the conservative accounting policies and their employee stock option system.

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