题名

Does Managerial Legal Liability Affect Corporate Diversification?

并列篇名

管理人員法律責任是否影響公司多角化?

DOI

10.6552/JOAR.2018.66.4

作者

陳光政(Guang-Zheng Chen);翁慈青(Tzu-Ching Weng);紀信義(Hsin-Yi Chi)

关键词

Corporate Governance ; D&O Insurance ; Corporate Diversification ; Shareholders' Value ; 公司治理 ; D&O保險 ; 公司多角化 ; 股東價值

期刊名称

會計評論

卷期/出版年月

66期(2018 / 01 / 01)

页次

121 - 161

内容语文

英文

中文摘要

We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on corporate diversification and firm value. D&O insurance can encourage managers to take risks and lower diversification, but it can also entrench managers and lead to empire building. Because higher D&O insurance coverage shields managers from market discipline and exacerbates agency problems associated with managerial opportunism, we argue that managers are more likely to exhibit higher levels of diversification that destroy shareholders' value. Using archival data from a sample of 1,332 Taiwanese listed firms in the period 2008-2014, we find that excess D&O insurance coverage is associated with higher levels of corporate diversification, more specifically, unrelated diversification. In addition, we find that corporate diversification, and unrelated diversification in particular, reduces firm value for firms with excess D&O coverage. Our results show that, in the context of Taiwan, D&O insurance affects diversification and firm value. Therefore, D&O insurance is a useful source of information for shareholders when they make investment decisions. In addition, this study offers insights for policy makers who are interested in regulating D&O insurance and its related disclosures.

英文摘要

本文檢測董監及重要職員責任保險(D&O保險)對公司多角化與公司價值的影響。D&O保險促使管理人員承擔風險並降低多角化,然而,D&O保險亦可能促使管理人員侵佔公司利益進而建立企業帝國。由於較高的D&O保險能保護管理人員來自市場的懲戒,並惡化管理人員機會主義的代理問題,本文認為管理人員可能採取較高程度的多角化並傷害公司價值。本文以2008-2014年之1,332家臺灣上市公司為樣本,研究發現超額D&O保險與較高的多角化程度有關,特別是無關多角化。再則,本文發現公司多角化,特別是無關多角化,會降低有超額D&O保險之公司的價值。本文的結果證實在台灣的背景下,D&O保險會影響公司多角化與公司價值。因此,D&O保險對股東而言,在制定投資決策上是一項有用的資訊來源。而本研究亦提供政策制定者在管理D&O保險與相關揭露上有更深入的了解。

主题分类 社會科學 > 財金及會計學
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被引用次数
  1. 劉若蘭,溫宜潔,黃怡萍(2020)。董監事法律責任保險訊息是否影響分析師盈餘預測品質。會計與公司治理,15(1),1-28。
  2. 湯麗芬,李建然,呂幸蓉(2020)。董監事責任保險與公司價值之關聯性:從股票投資者角度探討。證券市場發展季刊,32(4),31-72。