女性主義立場論與社會習性

The Habitus of Feminist Standpoint: An Oxymoron?

10.6350/JSSP.200509.0653

吳秀瑾(Shiu-Ching Wu)

女性主義立場論 ； 社會習性 ； 知識優勢 ； 無體現的主體 ； 體現的從屬 ； feminist standpoint theory ； habitus ； the epistemic priviledge ； disembodieed subject ； embodied subjection

人文及社會科學集刊

17卷3期（2005 / 09 / 01）

653 - 682

繁體中文

女性主義立場論和布爾迪厄的「社會習性論」是當代兩種社會理論。立場論主張越是處於社會的劣勢，弱勢者就越是具有認知的獨特位置，越能掌握社會整體關係的全貌。相反的，社會習性論則強調越是社會的弱勢者，越是顯示弱勢者無意識的認知信念和主流社會價值無意識的不謀而合。可見，將立場論和「社會習性」並列成一個詞組，顯然會是古怪的組合。 本文的焦點在於消弭上述兩理論間的矛盾性，提出立場論和「社會習性論」這兩種社會理論可以交會，互相增益，繼而超越個別理論的限制。女性立場論的社會習性分析將形成理論新視野，從合併理論的新視野可以較具體的落實兩理論都希望企及的體現行動(embodied action)。

Both Feminist standpoint theory and Bourdieu's habitus, the two leading contemporary social theories, have been taking separate ways in their theoretical development. The attempt to link the two seems to be a mission impossible, since standpoint theory holds that thinking from women's lives conveys the epistemological privilege, leading to less partial and less distorted knowledge, whereas the conception of women's habitus suggests otherwise, namely, the unconscious fit between the dominated and dominant. The term that combines standpoint and habitus, accordingly, must generate an oxymoron. This paper aims at challenging the above contradictory association, instead arguing that the conception of standpoint's habitus is not only plausible but also legitimate. The way to link the two social theories is by thinking of each other in terms of their own core concepts. In principle, each theory serves as heuristic tools to understand the other one. Bourdieu's major concepts, such as embodiment, social fields, symbolic struggle and sense of the game are utilized to grasp the full contents of standpoint theory. By corollary, the core concept of standpoint theory, namely, the epistemic privilege of the least advantaged, can uncover the practical implications of habitus theory. The vantage point gained from these theoretical connections resuet in new theoretical advantage, which leads us to see the theoretical weakness on each side. Each theory, taken separately, either falls into theoretical inconsistency or fails the goal it aims at, i.e., to transcend individual autonomy and structure determination by way of embodied practices. The paper thus concludes that the feminist habitus as a result of new theoretical advantage can maintain the delicate balance between deter mined structure and free action.

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