常識、錯誤與道德客觀性

Commonsense, Error, and Moral Objectivity

10.6350/JSSP.201003.0001

許漢(Hahn Hsu)

道德 ； 客觀性 ； 常識道德觀 ； 錯誤理論 ； 投射論 ； moral objectivity ； commonsense view of morality ； error theory ； projectivism

人文及社會科學集刊

22卷1期（2010 / 03 / 01）

1 - 39

繁體中文

本文嘗試由一個常識道德觀的角度來說明、闡述道德客觀性這個概念或主張之證成的可能性。這個常識道德觀之論述主張，倫理學或道德哲學的工作首先是對於日常道德經驗與現象的理解與闡述，如此，規範倫理學也同樣是基於對日常道德的哲學反省與理解，而有其規範性的論述與主張。如此，常識道德觀除了有規範性的論述之外，也有後設倫理學的主張。理解道德客觀性是日常道德判斷所肯定或預設的，還是許多哲學家也同意的，不過，其中有些哲學家以後設倫理學的角度來否定道德客觀性，梅奇由消極與積極兩理路來論證其反對道德客觀性的主張，消極的是提出「錯誤理論」，而積極的主張則建立在休謨式的投射論，以之來否定並重構日常道德的客觀性信念的意義。本文討論、批評梅奇的主張，論證兩者並不具有足夠的理論力量來拒絕常識道德的客觀性概念與預設。

This paper attempts to explicate the concept and claim of moral objectivity in terms of a commonsense view of morality. This in turn indicates an alternative possibility of justifying moral objectivity. The commonsense view holds that the task of ethical theory or moral phi1osophy aims at an understanding of ordinary moral experience and phenomenon. In this light, the so-called normative ethics presents normative discourses in virtue of how it understands ordinary morality. Such an approach to ethics naturally imglies that the proposed commonsense view of morality has its own metaethical positions and discourses. It will be argued by the commonsense view that the belief in moral objectivity is claimed or assumed in ordinary experience of moral judgments. Many philosophers agree on this. However some of them adopt certain metaethical considerations to reject this commonsense conviction. J. L. Mackie provides negative as well as positive arguments to support his rejection, that is, his Error Theory and a Humean projectivism, respectively. In this paper, Ⅰ shall explain why neither of them is enough to serve as conclusive arguments against the proposed commonsense view of moral objectivity.