Schotter國家形成模型的修正與衍伸

The Schotter Model of the Emergence of the State: Some Corrections and Extensions

10.6277/ter.2001.291.3

陳師孟(Shih-Meng Chen)

國家形成 ； 自然狀態 ； 受害者匱乏性 ； emergence of state ； state of nature ； scarcity of victims

經濟論文叢刊

29卷1期（2001 / 03 / 01）

49 - 67

繁體中文

國家形成的原因與過程雖然是政治經濟學上的一個重要課題，但文獻上似乎只有Schotter(1981)採用了成本效益分析架構予以嚴謹模型化，並且推導出「國家的最終規模將涵蓋社會全體」的結論。本文的目的有二：一方面指出在Schotter推論過程，出現了兩個重大失誤，若不予以修正，其結論將無法獲得。另一方面，本文指出相關國家形成的討論大致可分為「防衛型」、「生產型」、與「分配型」三大類，而Schotter模型的基本出發點只代表「防衛型」，因此本文嘗試將其架構應用在其他兩種類型的分析上，以整合以上為一種綜合論述。

One of the most fascinating and yet difficult subjects in political economics is he study of the emergence of the state. Among numerous explorations in the literature, we find only Schotter (1981) presenting a formal model within a cost-benefit framework. His main conclusion is that a state is self-generating and self-reinforcing until it is all-encompassing in the form of a ”grand association” a la Nozick (1975). The purpose of this note is twofold: Firstly, we want to Joint out two rather serious logical mistakes in Schotter's derivation of his results. Without their correction, his above-mentioned conclusion is dynamically untenable. Secondly, we Want to show that Schotter's model provides an intriguing framework for analyzing the emergence of the state not just from a Hobbesian ”protective approach”, bur also from a Srnithian ”cooperative approach” and an unorthodox ”distributive approach”, We thus extend his model in these directions and arrive at a synthesis.

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