题名

Experimental Evidence on Voting Rationality and Decision Framing

并列篇名

投票理性與決策架構的實驗驗證

DOI

10.6277/ter.2002.302.5

作者

徐麗振(Li-Chen Hsu);宋玉生(Yu-Sen Sung)

关键词

決策架構 ; 實驗 ; 投票率的工具理論 ; decision framing ; experiments ; instrumental theory of voter turnout

期刊名称

經濟論文叢刊

卷期/出版年月

30卷2期(2002 / 06 / 01)

页次

247 - 272

内容语文

英文

中文摘要

本文採用20,40,與70個實驗對象等選舉規模,檢驗所謂的「投票率的矛盾」。實驗報酬的設計誘使實驗對象視投票為獲取利益的工具。實驗結果顯示他們確實會因此而投票,但投票工具論無法完全解釋某些現實選舉中的投票率。投票工具論的相關模型,例如預期效用極大,極小極大後悔,以及賽局理論等模型,也未能成功地解釋由實驗所產生的投票率。此外,把問題架構為實驗對象會因決策錯誤而遭受損失,而非因決策正確而得到利益,會產生較高的投票意願,但只有在較小的選舉規模中才成立。此一發現建議,當實驗對象認為他自己較不關鍵時,決策架構所造成的不對稱誘因對他的投票決策影響較小。

英文摘要

Electorate sizes of 20, 40, and 70 subjects are used (0 test the paradox of voter turnout. Payoff schemes are designed to induce subjects to vote instrumentally. Our experimental evidence indicates that subjects do vote instrumentally, bur instrumental voting may lot fully explain voter turnouts in some real elections. In addition, theoretical studies associated with instrumental voting, e.g., the expected utility maximization model, the minimax regret model, and game-theoretic models cannot successfully explain the resulting voter turnouts. Our experimental evidence also shows that subjects are more willing to vote when the situation is framed as one in which they will lose something if they make wrong decisions rather Ian one in which they will gain something if they make right decisions, but only in relatively small sizes of electorates. This suggests that as the subject perceives himself to be less pivotal, the asymmetric incentive attributable to framing provides less influence on his voting decisions.

主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
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