公營廠商民營化的最適釋股比例分析

The Optimal Government Shareholdings in Public Enterprises in the Process of Privatization

10.6277/ter.2006.342.4

邱俊榮(Jiunn-Rong Chiou)；黃鴻(Hong Hwang)

公營廠商 ； 民營化 ； 最適持股 ； public enterprise ； privatization ； optimal shareholdings

經濟論文叢刊

34卷2期（2006 / 06 / 01）

245 - 259

繁體中文

本文主要的目的在於探討公營廠商民營化過程中的最適釋股比例。假設市場上存有國內外民營廠商、它們的邊際成本皆屬固定、廠商間從事Cournot數量競爭，本文發現惟有當本國公營廠商的生產效率比民營廠商差時，政府才應將公營廠商民營化，此一結果與文獻上普遍假設廠商邊際成本為遞增時之結果（如De Fraja 1991或Matsumura 1998）有顯著之差異。此外，本文亦發現當本國民營廠商數越多時，最適的民營化釋股比例應越高；惟有當本國民營廠商數甚多時，外國廠商數增加才會使最適的民營化最適釋股比例降低。在本國民營廠商可以自由進出市場的情況下，本國民營廠商的家數會隨著公營廠商民營化程度之提高而增加。

Governments usually hold stock in public enterprises that are in the process of privatization in order to preserve control when the government needs to intervene. The aim of this paper is to find the socially optimal government stock shares in the privatization process. We consider a market with a public enterprise and many domestic and foreign private firms. The marginal cost of firms is assumed to be constant. The main findings are as follows. Privatization is needed only when the production of the public enterprise is less efficient than that of private firms. This is in contrast to the findings of De Fraja (1991) and Matsumura (1998) that the public enterprise should privatize even when firms have identical cost structures. The government should reduce its stock holding in the public enterprise when the number of domestic private firms increases. However, if the number of domestic private firms is sufficiently large, the government should raise its stake in the public enterprise when the number of foreign private firms increases. Furthermore, with free entry and exit for domestic firms, the number of domestic private firms will increase as the degree of privatization increases.

1. Anderson, S. P.,Palma, A.,Thisse, J. F.(1997).Privatization and efficiency in a differentiated industry.European Economic Review,41,1635-1654.
2. Cremer, H.,Marchand, M.,Thisse, J. F.(1989).The public firm as an instrument for regulating an oligopolistic market.Oxford Economic Papers,41,283-301.
3. Cremer, H.,Marchand, M.,Thisse, J. F.(1991).Mixed oligopoly with differentiated products.International Journal of Industrial Organization,9,43-53.
4. De Fraja, G.(1991).Efficiency and privatization in imperfectly competitive industries.Journal of Industrial Economics,39,311-321.
5. De Fraja, G.,Delbono, F.(1989).Alternative strategies of a public enterprise in oligopoly.Oxford Economic Papers,41,302-311.
6. De Fraja, G.,Delbono, F.(1990).Game theoretic models of mixed oligopoly.Journal of Economic Surveys,4,1-17.
7. Fershtman, C.(1990).The interdependence between ownership status and market structure: The case of privatization.Economica,57,319-328.
8. Fjell, K.,Pal, D.(1996).A mixed oligopoly in the presence of foreign private firms.Canadian Journal of Economics,29,737-743.
9. George, K.,La Manna, M.(1996).Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership.Review of Industrial Organization,11,853-860.
10. Matsumura, T.(1998).Partial privatization in mixed duopoly.Journal of Public Economics,70,473-483.
11. Mujumdar, S.,Pal, D.(1998).Effects of indirect taxation in a mixed oligopoly.Economics Letters,58,199-204.
12. Pal, D.,White, M. D.(1998).Mixed oligopoly, privatization, and strategic trade policy.Southern Economic Journa,65,264-281.
13. White, M.(1996).Mixed oligopoly, privatization and subsidization.Economics Letters,53,189-195.

1. 陳柏安,林燕淑,王光正(2019)。醫療價格管制與公民營醫院的品質研發及製程研發。應用經濟論叢，105，39-71。
2. 郭虹瑩(2015)。成本異質、配置的生產效率與最適的釋股比例。農業與經濟，54，47-72。
3. 郭虹瑩、翁堃嵐瑩、林宛儀(2014)。混合寡占市場下利潤稅的中立性與最適釋股比例。應用經濟論叢，96，105-126。
4. 郭彥君,許竹筌(2022)。工會與公營事業民營化。亞太經濟管理評論，25(1&2)，53-66。
5. 黃芳玫、林柏翰(2018)。台灣公營事業民營化對受僱員工薪資與就業之影響─長期追蹤資料分析。經濟論文，46(2)，185-223。
6. 邱俊榮、王佳琪(2010)。存在環境污染下的公營廠商最適民營化政策。經濟論文，38(1)，61-84。
7. 顏志達、彭朋義、吳朝欽(2018)。利益團體、民營化與關稅政策。經濟論文，46(1)，99-132。