污染許可交易與利益團體

Tradable Emission Allowance and Interest Groups

10.6277/ter.2006.343.1

賴育邦(Yu-Bong Lai)

利益團體 ； 環境政策 ； 可交易污染許可 ； interest groups ； environmental policy ； tradable emission allowances

經濟論文叢刊

34卷3期（2006 / 09 / 01）

261 - 284

繁體中文

本文利用共同代理模型探討利益團體對可交易污染許可數量的影響，並將重點置於初期污染許可分配比率的效果。根據Montgomery (1972)，不同的初期污染許可分配比率只會改變所得分配，但不致影響資源配置的效率。然而本文發現，一旦將利益團體干擾納入考量，且各利益團體的遊說效率有所不同時，初期許可分配比率的變動，將改變政府所發放的排放許可總量，使其背離社會最適水準。本文亦比較政治均衡之排放許可總量與社會最適之數量，發現污染產業並不會一昧地追求較多數量的排放許可，在某些情況下，均衡的污染管制較社會最適水準來得更嚴格。本文也探討初期許可分配比率的變動對社會福利的衝擊。許多國家將初期排放許可全部發放給舊污染源，新污染源須向舊污染源購買足夠的許可方可生產。本文發現若將部分的初期排放許可分配給新污染源，當新舊污染源的遊說效率相近時，可提升社會福利；然而，若舊污染源的遊說效率顯著優於新污染源時，社會福利反而會下降。

By constructing a common-agency model, this paper investigates the influences of interest groups on the amount of emission allowance. We focus on the effect of a change in the distribution of the initial allowance. According to Montgomery (1972), differences in the distribution of initial allowances affects only the income distribution, but not resource allocation. However, we find that changes in distribution of initial allowances are no longer allocational-neutral, provided that the influence of interest groups are present and the interest groups have different lobbying efficiency. We also compare the political equilibrium amount of emission allowances with the socially optimal level, and find that the former may be more stringent than the latter. The impact of changing the distribution of initial allowances on social welfare is another major concern. Suppose the established polluting sources own all of the initial allowances. We find that granting a certain proportion of initial allowances to the new polluting sources gives rise to an ambiguous effect on social welfare, which depends on the relative lobbying efficiency of interest groups.

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