系統產品的整合與競爭

Integration in Complementary Product Competition

10.6277/ter.2007.352.1

王光正(Kuang-Cheng Andy Wang)；蔡思慧(Szu-Hui Tsai)

系統產品 ； 水平整合 ； 垂直整合 ； complementary products ； vertical integration ； horizontal integration

經濟論文叢刊

35卷2期（2007 / 06 / 01）

117 - 153

繁體中文

本文討論系統產品廠商間的各種可能整合。在各種可能整合下，我們討論廠商間的競爭型態、系統產品價格及整合對社會福利的影響。本文得到結果如下：和獨立廠商競爭時相較下，組合商品競爭下的系統產品價格較低，平行水平整合下的系統產品價格較高，而平行垂直整合與完全整合下的系統價格則不一定，這兩種整合下的價格與獨立廠商競爭時價格的差異取決於系統產品間的水平差異性大小。在福利分析方面，組合商品競爭與完全整合兩種整合型態最接近社會福利極大，其次是平行垂直整合，獨立廠商競爭與平行水平整合兩種情況則最不容易達成社會福利極大。這個結果部分支持目前法律對廠商垂直或水平整合的規範。

In this paper, we analyze possible integration types in complementary product competition along with firms' behavior, market equilibrium and social welfare under these possible integration types. Our main conclusions are as follows. First, in comparison with the situation of independent ownership, the system products' price is lower when there is composite good competition and higher when there is parallel horizontal integration, but the system price differential between the cases of independent ownership and parallel vertical integration (or joint ownership) is ambiguous. The system price differential between the independent ownership case and these two kinds of integration types depends on horizontal substitution among complementary products. Second, the social welfare when there is composite good competition or joint ownership is closest to the maximum, followed by the case of parallel vertical integration. Independent ownership and parallel horizontal integration are the two most difficult cases under which to achieve social welfare maximization. Our conclusions partly support current regulations.