懲罰怠惰、流失人才？升等續聘標準的經濟分析

Punishing Shirkers and Brain Drain: An Economic Analysis of a Stricter Standard for Academic Promotion and Review

10.6277/ter.2009.373.3

林忠正(Chung-Cheng Lin)

升等續聘 ； 偷懶 ； 反淘汰 ； academic promotion ； shirking ； adverse selection

經濟論文叢刊

37卷3期（2009 / 09 / 01）

301 - 323

繁體中文

要提升學術研究績效，在短期要使聘用人才努力以赴，在長期要吸引傑出人才並淘汰不適任者。本文分析一個簡單的偷懶反淘汰模型，指出提高升聘標準來刺激研究績效的想法，雖然短期有克服偷懶問題的好處，關於人才流動的長期觀點上則利弊互見。提高升續標準，長期雖可淘汰素質不佳人員，達到懲罰怠惰去蕪存菁的斷尾效果，但也會因不能吸引人才，付出懲罰怠惰流失人才的代價。若學術的突破，主要仰賴傑出人士的熱忱投入，而非依靠淘汰能力較差者，則提高升聘標準的斷尾利得可能無法彌補菁英流失的損失，長期將使研究績效不升反降。

Popular wisdom has it that a stricter standard for academic promotion and/or review will improve the research productivity of scholars. My belief is that the popular wisdom is right in the short-run, but it may be wrong in the long-run. A stricter standard can deter the shirking problem among scholars and improve their research performance (the short-run effect), but it may discourage able youth from entering this professional and result in lower research productivity in the future (the long-run effect). A shirking-adverse selection efficiency wage model is set up to show this belief.

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