题名

Employer's Reporting of Worker's Income, Incentive Contracts, and Tax Compliance

并列篇名

雇主申報員工薪資制度下之誘因契約設計

DOI

10.6277/TER.2013.414.1

作者

蔡崇聖(Tsung-Sheng Tsai)；楊建成(C. C. Yang)

关键词

薪資申報 ； 逃漏稅 ； 誘因契約 ； income reporting ； tax evasion ； incentive contract

期刊名称

經濟論文叢刊

卷期/出版年月

41卷4期（2013 / 12 / 01）

页次

339 - 363

内容语文

英文
中文摘要

本文考慮員工薪資是由雇主申報給政府的情況。政府不能觀察到員工的真正薪資，必須透過稽查方能得知。由於稽查有成本，政府不會永遠稽查員工。因此雇主可以透過誘因契約的設計，幫助員工低報其應負的稅額。由此雇主可以誘使員工更加努力工作，進而提高產量。我們也發現，比起另一個現行的制度，即由員工自行申報其薪資，這個制度可能帶給雇主更高的利潤，給政府更高的稅收。
英文摘要

This paper analyzes the role played by the firm in tax compliance. The IRS cannot observe the worker's income, and so the employer has to report the worker's income to the IRS. The IRS can audit the worker when there is a possibility of tax evasion. We argue that the report made by the employer can become a tool used to control the worker's incentive to work. Compared to the second-best contract, it is possible that the employer can promise to report a lower wage income and induce the worker to put forth more effort, when the IRS audits the worker less frequently. Both the employer and the worker may be better off under such a reporting system.
主题分类 社會科學 > 經濟學
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