英文摘要
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This study investigates a three-stage game of delegation choice, incentive contract choice, and subsequent quantity choice with a general number of firms. Profit-maximizing owners of firms choose whether to delegate or not to delegate in the first stage, and those firms that choose to delegate decide their incentive contract in the second stage. In the third stage, the owners or managers compete in quantity according to their respective objectives. With linear demand functions and symmetric cost functions, we show that if there are more than three firms in the market and the cost of hiring a manager and production costs are relatively high, or the market size is relatively small, then all firms choose not to delegate. If the costs of hiring a manager and production cost are relatively low, or the market size is relatively large, then all firms choose to delegate. If the cost of hiring a manager, production costs, or the market size is relatively moderate, then some firms choose to delegate, while the others choose not to delegate. In this case, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium will coincide with the Stackelberg solution.
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