题名 |
產業外產品創新授權及福利分析 |
并列篇名 |
Quality Competition, Outsider Patentee Licensing, and Welfare |
DOI |
10.6277/TER.201812_46(4).0004 |
作者 |
郭平欣(Ping-Sing Kuo);曹古駒(Ku-Chu Tsao);邱靖珈(Jing-Jia Chiou);林燕淑(Yan-Shu Lin) |
关键词 |
業外授權 ; 產品品質創新 ; 垂直差異 ; 社會福利 ; outsider patentee ; vertical differentiation ; licensing ; negotiation |
期刊名称 |
經濟論文叢刊 |
卷期/出版年月 |
46卷4期(2018 / 12 / 01) |
页次 |
619 - 644 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
本文利用循序談判賽局探討在品質異質的雙占價格競爭中,業外品質技術擁有者的授權行為。本文得到:(1)如果新技術屬於利潤極大化的業外廠商,則當授權前的品質競爭不激烈,新技術授權給高品質廠商並收取策略授權金;當授權前的品質競爭激烈,但是新技術提高品質有限,以傳統授權金移轉技術給高品質廠商;當授權前的品質競爭激烈,但是新技術可以大幅提升品質,以傳統授權金移轉技術給低品質廠商為最有利。(2)如果新技術屬於政府,政府會希望將新技術移轉給低品質廠商;當新技術與高品質差異不大時,需補貼低品質廠商使用新技術。 |
英文摘要 |
We analyze the optimal licensing strategy of an outside patent holder of a superior quality technology for a Bertrand duopoly with different product quality in a finite stage sequential bargaining game. Two types of fixed-fees are considered, a strategic one and the conventional one. If the new technology is owned by a revenue maximizing outsider, it is shown that the optimal licensing strategy is transferring the patent (1) to the original high quality firm with a strategic fixed fee when the quality difference between the duopoly is large enough, (2) to the original high quality firm with a conventional fixed fee when the quality difference is small and the new technology helps little, and (3) to the original low quality firm with a conventional fixed fee, otherwise. If the new technology is owned by a social welfare maximizing government agency, it is shown that transferring technology to the low quality firm is optimal and a subsidy is required in case the new quality is improved very little. |
主题分类 |
社會科學 >
經濟學 |
参考文献 |
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