外資持股、民營化與廠商進入時序

Endogenous Timing in a Mixed Duopoly with Partial Foreign Ownership and Partial Privatization

10.6277/TER.202212_50(4).0001

張瑞雲(Ray-Yun Chang)；黃鴻(Hong Hwang)

內生進入時序 ； 外資持股 ； 民營化 ； 混合雙佔 ； Stackelberg模型 ； endogenous timing ； partial foreign ownership ； partial privatization ； mixed duopoly ； Stackelberg model

經濟論文叢刊

50卷4期（2022 / 12 / 01）

371 - 393

繁體中文;英文

傳統產業結構大多假設廠商的進入市場時序為外生給定，並未討論廠商為何選擇「先後進入市場」（即市場為「Stackelberg領導者／跟隨者競爭」）或是「同時進入市場」（即市場為「Cournot數量競爭」）。本文建構一個混合雙佔模型，探討外資持股變化對廠商最適進入市場時序的影響。本文的分析結果指出：當民營化程度很高（低）時，其均衡進入時序為Cournot數量競爭（公營廠商為領導廠商或為跟隨廠商），且上述均衡完全不受外資持股比例之影響。但是當民營化程度屬中間值時，隨著外資持股比例之增加，均衡進入時序依序會由公營廠商為領導廠商或跟隨廠商，演變成公營廠商必然為一跟隨廠商，再演變成Cournot數量競爭。此外，其它條件不變下，外資持股的增加，可能使本國社會福利不降反升。這些結果與既有文獻之結論迥異。

Considering partial privatization of a public firm, this paper investigates the impacts of foreign ownership on endogenous timing in a mixed duopoly. We find that if the degree of privatization is high (low), the equilibrium is Cournot competition (public leadership or private leadership), irrespective of the foreign ownership ratio of the private firm. Nevertheless, if the degree of privatization is at an intermediate level, the equilibrium becomes sensitive to the degree of foreign ownership, changing from either public leadership or private leadership to private leadership, and finally to Cournot competition. Moreover, to our surprise, social welfare may increase with the foreign ownership. This result stands in stark contrast to previous literature, which asserts that foreign ownership always lowers social welfare.

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