伊拉克的「衝突韌性」分析：2018年國會選舉、庫區議會選舉與宗派主義的影響

Analysis on Conflict Resilience in Iraq: The 2018 Parliamentary Elections in the Central Government and Kurdish Regional Governments, and Sectarianism

10.6166/TJPS.202003_(83).0002

王順文(Shun-wen Wang)

衝突韌性 ； 2018年伊拉克國會選舉 ； 2018年庫區議會選舉 ； 阿巴音節 ； 宗派主義 ； 庫區獨立公投 ； Conflict Resilience ； 2018 Iraq Parliamentary Election ； Kurdish Independence Referendum ； 2018 KRG Parliamentary Election ； Sectarianism ； Arba'een Pilgrimage

政治科學論叢

83期（2020 / 03 / 01）

55 - 99

繁體中文

伊拉克的衝突情形有許多的面向，包括政府的失能、嚴重的貪腐，甚至包括宗派的對立等問題。但研究焦點多在「制度」面上探討重建的成敗，較少著眼於領導菁英的角色。「衝突韌性」的概念即是強調「和平建立」的過程應該投資在「由下而上」的建制上，以因應可能的衝突，並探討實地處理系統性危機的在地行為者如何從「建制」、「過程能力」與「結果」等三個層次來化解衝突。因此，本文將分為四個部分進行分析，第一部分將針對伊拉克的衝突根源與衝突韌性概念進行文獻回顧，並探討關於衝突韌性的相關文獻。第二個部分則主要探討2018年伊拉克國會選舉後的衝突韌性，第三個部分主要探討2017年庫區政府獨立公投後與中央政府之間，以及2018年庫區議會選後組建內閣的衝突與妥協過程，宗派主義也在伊拉克的衝突中扮演重要的角色，其中什葉派的朝聖活動「阿巴音節」（Arba'een Pilgrimage）所代表的是由宗教團體與地方政府協力，達到預防衝突與暴力並成功的案例，因此，本文將探討阿巴音節的解決衝突機制，並探討宗派主義與衝突韌性間的關聯性。最後，本文將根據衝突韌性概念下的建制、過程與結果層面，來分析伊拉克的衝突形式與結果，並作出結論。

Conflicts in Iraq are rooted in failures of governance, corruption, sectarianism and many other variables. This paper, however, focuses on the idea of ＂conflict resilience＂ which leads to an analysis of the depth of peace under the peace-building process in three major aspects: regimes, process capabilities and outcomes. This paper takes conflicts after Iraq's parliamentary election and the KRG's parliamentary election as examples, and it also deals with the sectarian leaders' role for Iraqis and the security mechanism during the Arba'een pilgrimage. This paper is divided into four parts: 1. The roots of conflict in Iraq and a review of papers on ＂conflict resilience＂; 2. Conflict resilience after the 2018 parliamentary election; 3. Conflict resilience after the 2017 KRG independence referendum and the 2018 KRG parliamentary election; 4. Sectarianism and the Arba'een pilgrimage. Finally, it analyzes conflict resilience in Iraq in the three aspects of the regime, process capabilities and outcomes in order to make a conclusion.

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