後蘇聯國家對外經貿關係選擇的研究：以烏克蘭為例

A Study on the Choices of Foreign Economic and Trade Relations in Post-Soviet Countries: The Case of Ukraine

10.6166/TJPS.202006_(84).0002

況正吉(Cheng-chi Kuang)

避險策略 ； 歐亞經濟聯盟 ； 歐盟 ； 澤倫斯基 ； Hedging Strategy ； Eurasian Economic Union ； European Union ； Zelensky

政治科學論叢

84期（2020 / 06 / 01）

39 - 70

繁體中文

蘇聯解體之後，原蘇聯地區內出現了獨立國協、歐亞經濟共同體、歐亞經濟聯盟等多個整合組織，但各成員國立場分歧，使得統合進程緩慢。獨立國協國家作爲俄羅斯的傳統勢力範圍與緩衝地區，對於俄羅斯的地區安全穩定和經濟發展有著重要意義。另一方面，隨著歐洲聯盟向東擴大，推出東部夥伴計畫，歐盟企圖影響後蘇聯國家，並且擠壓到俄羅斯的地緣戰略空間。烏克蘭危機之後，親歐派的政治力量處於壓倒性的地位，烏克蘭選擇歐盟並與俄國對抗，但受制於俄羅斯，國內經濟未有好轉，加入歐盟也沒重大進展。2019年烏克蘭新總統澤倫斯基（Володимир Зеленський）的崛起，即是烏國民眾對於傳統政治人物的不滿。本文經由烏克蘭的個案研究發現，烏國在面臨俄羅斯與歐盟兩強的格局下，同時身處於利害交錯不定的國際情勢時，會實施避險策略。但大國（俄羅斯）若是無法容忍，且要求選邊站的情況下，小國（烏克蘭）便只能在親歐和親俄間擇一，避險的對外政策則無法持續進行。

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many integration organizations, such as the Commonwealth of Independence States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community, and the Eurasian Economic Union appeared in the former Soviet territory. However, because there are serious differences in the positions of member states, integration has been slow. CIS countries, which are within the traditional sphere of influence and serve as a natural buffer zone for Russia, are of great significance to Russian regional security, stability and economic development. On the other hand, as the EU expands eastward, the Eastern Partner Program was launched in an attempt to influence the countries of the former Soviet Union and squeeze into Russia's geostrategic space. After the Ukrainian crisis, the political power of the pro-European faction was in an overwhelmingly superior position. Ukraine chose to side with the EU and confronted Russia. However, due to pressure from Russia, the domestic economy of Ukraine has not improved and there has been no significant progress in joining the EU. The rise of the new Ukrainian President Zelensky in 2019 represents the dissatisfaction of the Ukrainian people with traditional political figures. This paper finds through a case study in Ukraine that when facing the situation with Russia and the EU, and at the same time finding itself in a staggered international situation, the Ukrainian government implements a hedging strategy. However, if the big power (Russia) cannot tolerate this and asks for it to choose a side, the small power (Ukraine) can only choose between being pro-Europe or pro-Russia, and the hedging foreign policy strategy cannot continue.

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