题名

古樸塔及貝爾那普的真理修正理論述評

并列篇名

On Gupta and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth

DOI

10.7015/JEAS.200603.0075

作者

王文方(Wen-Fang Wang)

关键词

真理修正理論 ; 循環定義 ; 語意悖論 ; T-雙條件句 ; 塔斯基 ; the revision theory of truth ; circular definition ; semantic paradox ; T-biconditional ; Tarski

期刊名称

歐美研究

卷期/出版年月

36卷1期(2006 / 03 / 01)

页次

75 - 120

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

本論文旨在介紹並評論古樸塔及貝爾那普的真理修正理論。第一節說明T-雙條件句與說謊者語句間的緊張關係,並說明真理修正理論的目標。第二節說明真理修正理論的主要主張。第三節說明真理修正理論中的兩個形式語意論系統S*和S#。第四節說明真理修正理論中的一個自然演繹法演算系統C_0,並藉此檢視語意悖論與循環定義。在第五節中,我則仔細檢視真理修正理論的一些結果,討論針對該理論所發現的反例,並簡略提出我對真理問題的看法。我的結論是:儘管真理修正理論在邏輯上清楚、目標上部分成功,但我們仍有好的理由去反對它。

英文摘要

This paper aims at both introducing and commenting on Gupta and Belnap's revision theory of truth, and is divided into five sections. The first section points out the tension between T-biconditionals and the liar sentences. It also explains the goals of Gupta and Belnap's theory of truth. The second section gives an account of the major theses of Gupta and Belnap's revision theory of truth. The third section formalized the result of the previous section and expounds two formal semantic systems, S* and S#, in Gupta and Belnap's revised theory of truth. The forth section introduces and applies one of the natural deductive systems of their theory, C_0, in order to re-inspect some of the questions related to semantic paradoxes and circular definitions that are raised in the previous sections. In the fifth and final section, I examine in detail some of the consequences of Gupta and Belnap's revision theory of truth, discuss a few counterexamples discovered by Cook, Yaqub and myself, and propose my own view on the problem of truth. My conclusion is that, although Gupta and Belnap's revision theory of truth is both logically clear and partially successful, we nevertheless have good reasons to reject it.

主题分类 人文學 > 人文學綜合
社會科學 > 社會科學綜合
参考文献
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