論美國法上犯罪主觀要件與精神障礙心智缺陷抗辯：Clark v. Arizona案之判決評析

Mens Rea and Insanity Defense under U.S. Law-An Analysis of Clark v. Arizona

林志潔(Chih-Chieh Lin)

主觀 ； 故意 ； 精神障礙與心智缺陷 ； 正當法律程序 ； 證據 ； mens rea ； intent ； insanity ； due process of law ； evidence

歐美研究

39卷4期（2009 / 12 / 01）

615 - 670

繁體中文

人之精神狀態及心智能力決定其責任能力，與犯罪的主觀不法要件成立亦有關連。美國聯邦最高法院針對「亞利桑納州限縮精神障礙與心智缺陷抗辯成立範圍與證據提出方法」是否違反憲法正當法律程序的Clark v. Arizona案，做出「限縮精神障礙與心智缺陷抗辯成立範圍」及「限縮被告證據提出範圍」均「不違憲」的判決，引發各界高度關注。作者除介紹美國法上被告心神狀態在主觀要件及責任能力上的判斷標準和審理程序外，亦以該案為核心，探討精神障礙與心智缺陷成立標準與正當法律程序保障間的關係，及被告提出精神疾病證據的防禦權利，並以之為基礎，評析本判決可能產生的影響。

A person cannot be held criminally liable once he or she is found insane in criminal trial. In Clark v. Arizona, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that (1) Arizona's narrowing of its insanity test did not violate due process, and (2) Arizona's evidential rule, which excluded evidence of mental illness and incapacity due to mental illness on issue of mens rea, did not violate due process of law. The holding of the Supreme Court raises significant issues regarding the constitutional nature of the insanity defense and the constitutional right to present evidence. The issue is also tied to the defendant's mental state and challenges the common law tradition of mens rea and culpability. By reviewing the common law tradition and current legal models of the insanity defense in the U.S., this paper analyzes the case and its effects, and proposes an alternative means of thinking about the law and insanity.

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