题名

論邦斯的性別形上學與性別詞理論

并列篇名

On Elizabeth Barnes' Metaphysics of Gender and Theory of Gender Terms

DOI

10.7015/JEAS.202209_52(3).0003

作者

陳湘韻(Hsiang-Yun Chen);顏均萍(Chun-Ping Yen)

关键词

性別 ; 性別形上學 ; 性別詞 ; 社會位置論 ; 改良型分析 ; gender ; metaphysics of gender ; gender terms ; social position theory ; ameliorative project

期刊名称

歐美研究

卷期/出版年月

52卷3期(2022 / 09 / 01)

页次

463 - 503

内容语文

繁體中文

中文摘要

本文剖析邦斯於〈性別與性別詞〉一文中所提出的性別形上學與性別詞使用理論。邦斯認為,當代性別理論的謬誤在於將性別形上學跟性別詞的適用條件混為一談,他主張,後者屬於語言使用的範圍,可以(而且應該)從形上學的工作劃分出去。在形上學部分邦斯採取並修正了哈斯蘭格(Sally Haslanger)的社會位置論;在語言使用的部分,他強調形上學雖然不提供性別詞的適用條件,但仍會規範語言的使用。本文指出邦斯理論的可議之處,闡釋其性別詞分析的明顯缺失,並且質疑邦斯並未提出具足的論證,說明區分出形上學跟性別詞的使用,就必然更能達成改良型性別理論所追求的性別正義。

英文摘要

This paper introduces and critically evaluates the view Elizabeth Barnes (2020) proposes in "Gender and Gender Terms." According to Barnes, contemporary gender theories mistakenly conflate the task of a metaphysics of gender with the task of figuring out the application conditions of gender terms. She contends that we can and should separate the two, as the former is to explain the social reality of gender, which need not give us the definitions or truth conditions for sentences involving gender terms. Regarding the metaphysical component of her account, Barnes adopts and ameliorates Haslanger's social position theory; for the semantic and conceptual component, she emphasizes that though the metaphysics of gender does not provide the application conditions of gender terms, the former nevertheless constraints the use of the latter. We argue that Barnes' semantic analysis is far from satisfying. Moreover, it is not clear that separating the metaphysics of gender and the analysis of gender terms leads to more effective attainment of the ameliorative goal of gender equality.

主题分类 人文學 > 人文學綜合
社會科學 > 社會科學綜合
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