反例式哲學實驗：模態語意、理解規範與一個常態性理論

Counterexample Philosophical (Thought) Experiment: Modal Semantic Issues, Epistemic Normativity, and a Normalcy Account

10.7015/JEAS.202309_53(3).0002

侯維之(Richard Wei-Tzu Hou)

反例式哲學（思想）實驗 ； 異常體現 ； 知態規範性 ； 常態性 ； counterexample philosophical (thought) experiment ； deviant realization ； epistemic normativity ； normalcy

歐美研究

53卷3期（2023 / 09 / 01）

381 - 434

繁體中文;英文

反例式哲學實驗（哲學實驗）是分析哲學反駁形上學必然論題／原則的主要方法，但是異常體現的異例問題－哲學實驗文本的模態核心直覺判斷因細節增添而改變語意值，成為模態語意理論的挑戰，而相應的知識理論亦隨之分歧。本文具有三個目標，第一，經由知態規範性的討論，理清哲學實驗的語意和知態面向的關連。第二，設定必須滿足的語意暨知態條件，說明主流的毛桂蕊、市川與賈佛斯、威廉森、鄺德門與霍法斯的模態語意暨知識理論為何皆不成功，並據此建立歸納論證。第三，基於知態規範性和嘉德納與基德司所討論的常態性，建立與異常體現共存的常態性理論。

Raising counterexample philosophical thought experiments (here-after philosophical experiments) is one major method of analytic philosophy to refute theses or principles. Various mainstream theories address the modal semantics and modal epistemology of philosophical experiments. However, for a given vignette of a particular philosophical experiment, the semantic value of the original core modal judgement may be changed by adding more details to the vignette. This deviant realisation approach forms a major challenge to semantic as well as epistemological theories. This paper has three objectives. First, focusing on the epistemic normativity of how to properly understand the methodological features of philosophical experimentation, the connections between the semantic and epistemic aspects of philosophical experiments are clarified. Moreover, why the eradication of deviant realisations is not the only semantic option is explained accordingly. Second, by setting up semantic and epistemic conditions for their theories to satisfy, why mainstream theories of philosophical experiment-Malmgren's, Ichikawa and Jarvis', Williamson's, and Grundmann and Horvath's-fail their modal semantic and/or epistemological accounts are explained. An inductive argument is offered to show that semantic and epistemic theories based on standard possible world semantics do not seem to have good prospects of success. Third, by means of epistemic normativity and Gardiner's and Geddes' formulations of normalcy, a normalcy account of philosophical experiments is established.

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