题名 |
對康德哲學中分析判斷與綜合判斷的區分之探究 |
并列篇名 |
A Study of the Distinction between "Analytic" and "Synthetic" Judgement in the Philosophy of Kant |
DOI |
10.29653/LS.199306.0006 |
作者 |
林秉生(Ping-Sung Lin) |
关键词 |
分析的 ; 綜合的 ; 康德 ; 形上學 ; analytic ; synthetic ; Kant ; metaphysics |
期刊名称 |
鵝湖學誌 |
卷期/出版年月 |
10期(1993 / 06 / 01) |
页次 |
131 - 144 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
本文首先說明康德對分析判斷與綜合判斷所作的區分、以及這項區分對於形上學的意義.接著,筆者闡述耶爾和蒯因對於這項區分的批評和質疑。耶爾認爲康德根據兩套不同的標率作此區分,故其區分不能成立。耶爾據此否定形上學知識。蒯因則認爲:由淤我們無法爲「分析性」的概念提出圓滿的說明,所以在分析判斷和綜合判斷之間無法定出明確的界線。最後,筆者指出:耶爾和蒯因批評這項區分的理由並不充分,故無法否定這項區分的意義。 |
英文摘要 |
This article describes first of all the distinction between analytic judgement and synthetic judgement in the philosophy of Kant and the meanings of this distinction with regards to metaphysics. Secondly, I describe the critiques of this distinction by Ayer and Quine. Ayer maintains that Kant uses two different criteria in making this distinction, therefore Kant's view is not tenable. Subsequently, Ayer denies the validity of metaphysical knowledge. Quine maintains that since we are not able to fully elucidate ”analyticality,” therefore, we cannot clearly distinguish the boundaries between analytic judgement and synthetic judgement. Finally, I point oat the reasons why the critiques by Ayer and Quine are not sufficient, and thereby one cannot deny this distinction. |
主题分类 |
人文學 >
人文學綜合 人文學 > 歷史學 人文學 > 中國文學 |
参考文献 |
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