题名 |
「範疇直觀」在胡塞爾現象學中之意義 |
并列篇名 |
The significance of the Categorial Intuition in Husserl's Phenomenology |
DOI |
10.29653/LS.199512.0001 |
作者 |
汪文聖(Wen-Sheng Wang) |
关键词 |
胡塞爾 ; 範疇直觀 ; 理型樣變 ; 形式範疇 ; 物質範疇 ; 先天性 ; 本質 ; 想像 ; Husserl ; categorical intuition ; eidetic variation ; formal category ; material category ; apriority ; essence ; imagination |
期刊名称 |
鵝湖學誌 |
卷期/出版年月 |
15期(1995 / 12 / 01) |
页次 |
1 - 22 |
内容语文 |
繁體中文 |
中文摘要 |
別於康德之視範疇的建立只源於純悟性之能力,胡塞爾則強調感性與悟性一起來建構範疇。胡塞爾從早期的《邏輯研究》到晚期的《經驗與判斷》著作中,先後以「範疇直觀」、「本質直觀」、「理型直觀」、「理型樣變」等爲建構「形式範疇」與「物質範疇」之方法。本文將先對之介紹,即先根據幾位現象學者對「範疇直觀」提出一些問題,然後再參照《經驗與判斷》一書中的論點對之作深入的探討,其中包括是否範疇直觀可以充分地建構物質範疇?是否「想像」可以完全地脫離實在性覺知?最後,本文欲釐清胡塞爾著作中因對「本質還原」與「超驗還原」之處理順序不同所造成的困擾:由確定範疇直觀從實在性覺知出發之必要,來闡明胡塞爾以本質爲先天性的意義:即在就著眼於時間順序之「發生現象學」來看,本質之形成較經驗事實爲後;但就著眼於「有效性」之「靜態現象學」來看,本質在「有效性」上是先於一切事實的。 |
英文摘要 |
Differing from Kant's philosophy in which the catogories ground in the pure understanding only, Husserl emphasizes that intuition and understanding constitute the categories together. From the earlier work Logical Investigations to the later Experience and Judgment Husserl regards ”categorial intuition” (kategoriale Anschauung), ”essential intuition' (Wesensschau), eidetic intuition” (eidetische Intuition), ”eidetic variation” (eidetische Variation) etc. as the methods to constitute the formal and the material categories. After these methods have been introduced, I shall follow some phenomenologists and arise questions about the problems of the categorial intuition, then try to inquire them by means of Husserl's discussions in his Experience and Judgment, the problems for example: Can the categorial intuition constitute the material categories. sufficiently? Can the ”imagination” be free from a real perception completely? In the end. I want to explain the different sequence by Husserl's treatment of the ”essential reduction” (eidetische Reduktion) and the ”transcendental reduction” (transzendentale Reduktion) in his different works. Through the affirmation that the categorial intuition must start from a real perception, I explicate why Husserl points out the apriority of the essence compared with the fact: in view of the genetic phenomenology the essence develops later than the Fact, but in view of the static phenomenology the essence is apriori concerning his ”validity” (Gültigkeit) for the Fact. |
主题分类 |
人文學 >
人文學綜合 人文學 > 歷史學 人文學 > 中國文學 |
参考文献 |
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