台灣第三代行動通訊業務執照發放政策之經濟分析

An Economic Analysis of Taiwan's 3G Licensing Policy

10.6656/MR.2004.23.3.CHI.71

張興華(Alan Hsing-Hua Chang)

拍賣 ； 競標均衡策略 ； 第三代行動電信 ； 3G ； auction ； bidding strategy

管理評論

23卷3期（2004 / 07 / 01）

71 - 92

繁體中文

台灣地區之第三代行動電信業務執照(3G license)仿效歐洲國家之先例，採用拍賣(auction)方式發放。交通部電信總局共釋放5張執照，在有6家競標廠商的情況下，競價從九十一年元月十六日起，進行至二月六日止，在19天180回合的競價後，5張執照以總價新台幣488.99億元標出，較底價高出152.99億元。5張執照的平均價格接近百億台幣，因此競價的過程和結果廣受媒體矚目。 3G執照拍賣是政府第一次以拍賣方式釋放電信執照，過去的執照發放多採評審制。在政府形成決策前，對產官學界所做的徵詢中，有多數的意見認為3G執照發放仍應採評審制，或是認為拍賣並非一個好的發放方式。而在執照拍賣完成後，國內管理學者所做的一些研究也得到評審制優於拍賣的結論。這樣的意見，與歐美國家受經濟學家影響而逐一改用拍賣方式發放執照的趨勢相左。本文的目的在於，從經濟學的角度解釋經濟學家鼓吹以拍賣方式發放執照背後的理論與想法，希望藉此讓管理學界與經濟學界在這個課題上有進一步的對話與了解。

In April; 2000, the United Kingdom conducted the world's first third-generation (3G) spectrum auction, raising a total of 34 billion US dollars for 5 licenses. Since then, countries like Netherlands, Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Greece, Denmark, and Hong Kong have conducted their own 3G license auctions, with different details in auction design and with various degrees of success. Taiwan has just finished its 3G license auction on Feb. 6, 2002, raising a total of NT$48.9 billion (about 1.4 billion US dollars) for 5 license. On average, each license sold for nearly NT$10 billion, thus the auction has attracted much media attention. The 3G license auction marked the first time Taiwanese government used the auction to release and allocate spectrum licenses. In the past, this was done through comparative hearings, or beauty contests. Scholars in Taiwan communication arena in various occasions voiced their doubts about using auction to allocation spectrum licenses. This is in odd with the trend seen in many Western countries as these governments have taken the advices from economists and moved to the auction method. The purpose of this paper is to explain to the readers the rationale behind economists' vehement drive to popularize the auction method, and to answer several criticisms about auctions raised by the public.

1. 虞孝成、李宗耀(2002)。運用模糊多評準決策法評選我國3G電信執照發放策略。管理評論，21(1)，1-36。
   連結：
2. Benoit, I-P.,Krishna, V.(2001).Multiple-Object Auctions with Budget Constrained Bidders.Review of Economic Studies,68,155-179.
3. Binmore, K.,Klemperer, P.(2002).The Biggest Auction Ever: the Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licenses.Economic Journal,112,74-96.
4. Borgers, T.,Dustmann, C.(2002).Rationalizing the UMTS Spectrum Bids: The Case of the UK Auction.ifo Studien,48(1),77-109.
5. Borgers, T.,Dustmann, C.(2002).Strange Bids: Bidding Behavior in the United Kindom`s Third Generation Spectrum Auction.University College London.
6. Cable, J.,Henley, A.,Holland, K.(2002).SMB Research PapersSMB Research Papers,未出版
7. Capen, E. C.,Clapp, R. V.,Campbell, W. M.(1971).Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations.Journal of Petroleum Technology,23,641-53.
8. Coase, R. H.(1959).The Federal Communication Commission.Journal of Law and Economics,2,1-40.
9. Cramton, P.(2001).Handbook of Telecommunications Economics.Amsterdam, Netherlands:Elsevier Science.
10. Cramton, P.(1997).The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment.Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,6(3),431-95.
11. Cramton, P.,Schwartz, J.(2000).Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions.Journal of Regulatory Economics,17,229-252.
12. Economist(1997).Learning to Play the Game.
13. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R.,Kahn, C.(1998).Low Revenue Equilibria in Simultaneous Auctions.University of Illinois.
14. Ewerhart, C.,Moldovanu, B.(2002).The German UMTS Design: Insights from Multi-Object Auction Theory.ifo Studien,48(1),157-173.
15. Grant, Robert M.(2002).Contemporary Strategy Analysis.Cambridge, Mass.:Blackwell Publishers.
16. Grimm, V.,Riedel, R.,Wolfstetter, E.(2001).Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany.CESifo Working Paper,506
17. Hazlett, Thomas W.(1998).Assigning Property Rights to Radio Spectrum Users: Why Did FCC License Auctions Take 67 Years?.Journal of Law and Economics,41,529-575.
18. Hendricks, K.,Porter, R. H.,Boudreau, B.(1987).Information, Returns, and Bidding Behavior in OCS Auctions: 1954-1969.Journal of Industrial Economics,35,517-42.
19. Herzel, L.(1951).Public Interest and the Market in Color Television Regulation.University of Chicago Law Review,18,802-16.
20. Hirschey, M.(2002).Managerial Economics.Ohio:Thomson South Western.
21. Kagel, J. H.,Lavin, D.(2002).Common Value Auctions and the Winner`s Curse.Princeton:Princeton University Press.
22. Klemperer, P.(2002).What Really Matters in Auction Design.Journal of Economic Perspectives,16(1),169-189.
23. Klemperer, P.(2002).European Economic Review.
24. Klemperer, P.(2002).Some Observations on the British 3G Telecom Auction: Comments on Borgers and Dustmann.ifo Studien,48(1),115-120.
25. Krishna, V.(2002).Auction Theory.San Diego:Academic Press.
26. Mead, Walter J.,Moseidjoud, A.,Sorensen, P. E.(1983).The Rate of Return Earned by Lessees under Cash Bonus Bidding of OCS Oil and Gas Leases.The Energy Journal,4,37-52.
27. Milgrom, P.(2000).Putting Auction Theory to Work: The Simultaneous Ascending Auction.Journal of Political Economy,108,245-272.
28. Noll, R.,Peck, M. J.,McGowan, J. J.(1973).Economic Aspects of Television Regulation.Washington:Brookings Institutions.
29. Owen, Bruce M.,Beebe, J. H.,Manning, W. G.(1974).Television Economics.Lexington, Mass:Lexington Books.
30. Plott, C.,Salmon T.(2001).The Simultaneous, Ascending Auction: Dynamics of Price Adjustment in Experiments and in the Field.Florida State Univeristy.
31. Schmidt, Klaus M.(2002).Efficiency of the British UMTS Auction: A Comment on Borgers and Dustmann.ifo Studien,48(1),111-114.
32. Thaler, Richard H.(1988).The Winner`s Curse.Journal of Economic Perspectives,2(4),191-202.
33. Tresch, Richard W.(1981).Public Finance: A Normative Theory.Piano, Tex.:Business Publication Inc.
34. van Damme, E.(2002).The Dutch UMTS-Auction.ifo Studien,48(1),175-200.
35. 方伯亮、林祖嘉(2003)。管理經濟學。台北:智勝文化。
36. 交通部電信總局網站
37. 交通部電信總局網站
38. 交通部電信總局網站
39. 虞孝成、李宗耀(2002)。3G電信執照發放政策規劃與討論。科技管理月刊，7(1)，1-17。