經理人異動與股東財富效果

Management Turnover and Shareholder Wealth Effect

10.6656/MR.2006.25.1.CHI.23

黃旭輝(Hsu-Huei Huang)

經理人異動 ； 代理問題 ； 公司治理 ； 資訊不對稱 ； management turnover ； agency problem ； corporate governance ； information asymmetry

管理評論

25卷1期（2006 / 01 / 01）

23 - 45

繁體中文

在所有權與經營權分離的體制下，經理人可能為了追求其個人的私利而犧牲了股東的利益，如何降低代理問題對股東造成的不利影響，一直是財務學者的努力方向，其中董事會解僱績效不佳的經理人便是可能的解決方案之一。本文探討經理人的異動宣告對股東財富的影響，研究樣本包括民國85年至91年上市公司的總經理異動之186個樣本，實證結果發現非自願性經理人異動在異動之前的經營績效相對較差且異動宣告的股東財富效果顯著為正，自願性經理人異動在異動之前的經營績效相對較佳且異動宣告的股東財富效果顯著為負，另外我們也發現，經營績效愈差、資訊不對稱愈大以及外國專業投資機構(QFII)持股愈多的公司，經理人異動的宣告效果愈好；而且，資訊不對稱愈大和QFII持股愈多的公司，非自願性經理人異動的宣告效果也愈好。最後，本文也發現非家族企業的非自願性異動與其前期績效不佳有較顯著的關聯。

Separation of management and ownership, managers could pursue their private benefit at the expense of shareholders. How to mitigate the negative effect on owners due to agency problem is a central issue in financial literature. We study the impacts of CEO turnover on shareholder wealth, our sample includes 186 event companies listed on Taiwan Stock Exchange during 1996-2002. The results show that (1) forced CEO turnover is associated with worse prior performance and significantly positive announcement effect, and voluntary CEO turnover is opposite, (2) firms with worse performance, higher information asymmetry, and more QFII stockholding would get better announcement effect, (3) companies with higher information asymmetry, and more QFII stockholding incurring forced turnover would be accompanied with higher announcement effect, (4) forced CEO turnover of non-family business is related to prior bad performance.

1. Allen, M. P.,S. K. Panian,R. E. Lotz(1982).Managerial Succession and Organizational Performance: A Recalcitrant Problem Revisited.Administrative Science Quarterly,24,167-180.
2. Borokhovich, K. A.,R. Parrino,T. Trapani(1996).Outside Directors and CEO Selection.Journal of Quantitative Analysis,31,337-355.
3. Brown, C. M.(1982).Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance: The Succession Effect.Administrative Science Quarterly,27,1-16.
4. Chung, K.,C. Charoenwong(1991).Investment Option, Assert in Place, and the Risk of Stock.Financial Management,20,21-33.
5. Dahay, J.,J. J. McConnell,N. G. Travlos(2002).The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance, and Top Management Turnover.Journal of Finance,1,461-483.
6. Datta, S.,M. I. Datta,A. Patel(2000).Some Evidence on the Uniqueness of Initial Public Debt Offerings.Journal of Finance,55,715-743.
7. Denis, D. J.,D. K. Denis(1995).Performance Changes Following Top Management Dismissals.Journal of Finance,50,1029-1057.
8. Denis, D.J.,D. K. Denis,A. Sarin(1997).Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover.Journal of Finance Economics,45,193-221.
9. Eitzen, S. E.,N. R. Yetman(1972).Managerial Change, Longevity, and Organizational Effectiveness.Administrative Science Quarterly,17,110-116.
10. Fama, E. F.,Jensen(1983).Separation of Ownership and Control.Journal of Law and Economics,26,301-325.
11. Farrell, K. A.,D. A. Whidbee(2002).Monitoring by the Financial Press and Forced CEO Turnover.Journal of Banking and Finance,26,2249-2276.
12. Gamson, W.A.,N. A. Scoth(1964).Scapegoating in Baseball.American Journal of Sociology,70,69-72.
13. Gephart, R. P.(1978).Status Degradation and Organizational Succession: An Ethnomethodological Approach.Administrative Science Quarterly,23,553.
14. Gibbons, R.,K. J. Murphy(1990).Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers.Industrial and Labor Relation Review,43,30-51.
15. Gilson, S. C.(1989).Management and Turnover Financial Distress.Journal of Financial Economic,25,241-262.
16. Grusky, O.(1969).Managerial Succession and Organizat ion al Effectiveness.American Journal of Sociology,75,21-31.
17. Guest, R.(1962).Managerial Succession in Complex Organizations.American Journal of Sociology,68,47-54.
18. Hannan, M.,J. Freeman(1977).The Population Ecology of Organizations.American Journal of Sociology,82,929-964.
19. Harrison, R. J.,D. L. Torres,Kukalis, S.(1988).The Changing of the Guard: Turnover and Structural Change in the Top Management Positions.Administrative Science Quarterly,33,211-232.
20. Helmich, D. L.(1974).Organization Growth and Succession Patterns.Academy of Management Journal,17,771-775.
21. Holmstrom, B.(1979).Moral Hazard and Observability.Bell Journal of Economics,10,74-91.
22. Huson, M. R.,P. H. Malatesta,R. Parrino(2004).Managerial Succession and Firm Performance.Journal of Financial Economics,74,237-275.
23. James, D. R.,M. Soref(1981).Profit Constraints on Managerial Autonomy: Managerial Theory and the Unmaking of the Corporate President.American Sociological Revirew,46,1-18.
24. Jensen, K. G.,W. H. Meckling(1976).Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure.Journal of Financial Economics,3,305-306.
25. Jensen, M. C.(1993).The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control System.Journal of Finance,48,831-880.
26. Jensen, M. C., K. J. Murphy(1990).Performance Pay and Top-management Incentives.Journal ofpolitical economy,98,225-264.
27. John, K.,L. W. Senbet(1998).Corporate Governance and Board Effectiveness.Journal of Banking and Finance,22,371-403.
28. Kenser, I. F.,D. R. Dalton(1986).Board of Directors and the Checks and Balance of Corporate Goverance.Business Horizon,Sep./Oct.,17-23.
29. Lausten, M.(2002).CEO Turnover, Firm Performance and Corporate Governance: Empirical Evidence on Danish Firms.International Journal of Industrial Organizational,20,391-405.
30. Lewellwn, W.,C. Loderer,K. Martin(1987).Executive Compensation Contracts and Executive Incentive Problems: An Empirical Analysis.Journal of Accounting and Economics,9,287-310.
31. Lieberson, S.,J. F. O''Connor(1972).Leadership and Organizational Performance: Ar Study of Large Corporations.American Sociological Review,37,117-130.
32. Martin, K. J.,J. J. Mcconnell(1991).Corporate Performance, Corporate Takeovers, and Management Turnover.Journal of Finance,2,617-687.
33. Mikkelson, W. H.,M. M. Partch(1997).The Decline of Takeovers and Disciplinary Managerial Turnover.Journal of Financial Economics,79,205-208.
34. Millier, M. H.,F. Modiglani(1961).Dividend Policy Growth and the Valuation of Shares.Journal of Business,34,411-434.
35. Mizruchi, M. S.(1983).Who Controls Whom? An Ex aminat ion of the Relation between Management and Boards of Directors in Large American Corporations.Academy of Management Review,8,426-435.
36. Morek, R.,A. Shleifer,R. W. Vishny(1989).Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control.American Economic Review,79,842-852.
37. Oviatt, B. M.(1988).Agency and Transaction Cost Perspectives on the Manager-shareholder Relationship: Incentive for Congruent Interests.Academy of Management Review,13(2),214-225.
38. Pfeffer, J.,A. Davis-Blake(1986).Administrative Succession and Organizational Performance: How Administrator Experience Mediates the Succession Effect.Academy of Management Journal,29,72-83.
39. Puffer, S. M.,J. B. Weintrop(1991).Corporate Performance and CEO Turnover: The Role of Performance Expectation.Administrative Science Quarterly,36,1-19.
40. Robinson, B. S.,A. P. Brief(1985).CEO Succession among America's Largest Firm.Paper Presented at The National Meeting of The Academy of Management,San Diego:
41. Salancik, G. R.,J. Pfeffer(1980).Effects of Ownership and Performance on Executive Tenure in US Corporations.Academy of Management Journal,23,653-664.
42. Shivdasani, A.(1993).Board Cornposrnon, Ownership Structure, and Hostile Takeovers.Journal of Accounting and Economics,16,167-198.
43. Smith, J. E.,K. P. Carson,R. A. Alexander(1984).Leadership: It Can Make a Difference.Academy of Management Journal,27,765-776.
44. Warner, J. B.,R. L. Watts,K. H. Wruck(1988).Stock Prices and Top Management Changes.Journal of Financial Economics,20,461-492.
45. Weiner, N.,T. A. Mahoney(1981).A Model of Corporate Performance as a Function of Environmental, Organizational, and Leadership Influences.Academy of Management Journal,24,453-470.
46. Weisbach, M. S.(1988).Outside Directors and CEO Turnover.Journal of Financial Economics,20,431-460.
47. Yermack, D.(1996).Yermack, D..Journal of Financial Economics,40,185-211.
48. Zajac, E. J.(1990).CEO Selection, Succession, Compensation and Firm Performance: A Theoretical Integration and Empirical Analysis.Strategic Management Journal,11,217-230.
49. 林穎芬、祝道松、洪晨桓(2002)。經濟附加價值與高階主管離職之研究。管理會計，62，1-18。
50. 陳慧玲(2004)。碩士論文(碩士論文)。國立政治大學會計研究所碩士論文。
51. 黃旭輝、王育偉(2004)。國立高雄大學。

1. 蔡彥卿、林昆民、李淑華(2010)。力霸案引發之董監事離職潮與盈餘管理之關聯性研究。財務金融學刊，18(4)，37-72。
2. 陳欣妤、吳佩珊、王曉雯(2013)。研發支出與總經理薪酬─公司控制與成長機會對抑止管理性投機之影響。管理評論，32(1)，39-62+113-115。
3. 陳昭蓉(2021)。繼任總經理類型對盈餘平穩化之影響。會計評論，73，1-59。
4. 陳昭蓉,陳玉麟(2018)。繼任總經理類型、機構投資人類型與繼任初期之成本僵固性。中華會計學刊，14(2)，181-224。
5. 高茂峰、邱炳雲、林有志(2008)。更換經理人對公司經營績效之影響。會計與公司治理，5(2)，1-27。
6. 黃劭彥、陳珮甄、邱安安(2010)。會計主管異動與公司資訊內涵。文大商管學報，15(2)，21-49。
7. 李伶珠(2013)。員工績效與離職關係對組織獲利能力之影響。東海管理評論，15(1)，1-36。
8. 廖秀梅,陳英傑,李娟菁,江佳欣(2020)。總經理異動、財務主管異動與盈餘管理－兼論審計委員會的影響。會計審計論叢，10(2)，101-126。
9. 廖芝嫻、王大維(2015)。再探公司治理對經營績效與財務報導品質之影響：因素分析與類神經網路之應用。中華會計學刊，11(2)，169-201。
10. 吳明政、王曉雯(2011)。替換類型與市場競爭對總經理異動宣告股東財富之影響。人文及社會科學集刊，23(2)，1-35。
11. 張幸惠、姚名麗(2015)。董事會組成、財報品質與財務主管異動宣告效果。兩岸金融季刊，3(2)，27-67。
12. (2024)。公司發言人異動對股價影響之研究。管理資訊計算，13(1)，109-121。