相對績效評估與高階主管薪酬：論產業競爭程度之影響

Relative Performance Evaluation and Top Executive Compensation: The Effect of the Industry Competition

10.6656/MR.2006.25.1.CHI.69

蔡柳卿(Liu-Ching Tsai)

代理理論 ； 相對績效評估 ； 高階主管薪酬 ； Agency theory ； Relative performance evaluation ； Top executive compensation

管理評論

25卷1期（2006 / 01 / 01）

69 - 94

繁體中文

過去關於相對績效評估(relative performance evaluation; RPE)的研究並無定論。本研究聚焦於高階主管薪酬契約，旨在探討公司決定高階主管薪酬時是否採用RPE？以及產業競爭性是否影響RPE的運用程度？本研究以1996年至2001年間的台灣上市公司進行分析，結果發現，產業績效指標與薪酬間具有負向關係，惟並不顯著；而隨著產業競爭程度愈大（小），產業績效指標的負向薪酬權數愈大（小）。此結果顯示，並無強烈證據支持RPE的採用係存在於所有公司，但隨著競爭程度愈大，RPE有用性愈高，因而受到採用的程度也愈大，此與代理理論(Holmstrom 1982)的預期一致。本研究最後發現非家族控制之公司相對於家族控制公司而言，依產業競爭性採用RPE的程度更強，顯示RPE理論在國內公司的適用情況，須視是否屬家族控制型態而定。

Although economic theory provides a strong rationale for relative performance evaluation (RPE) based on risk-sharing, empirical research finds little support for the RPE hypothesis in executive compensation. Recently, Defond & Park (1999) report that RPE is more useful in CEO dismissal decisions for U.S. firms facing more competitive environments. However, there is still little evidence concerning the application of RPE in emerging markets such as Taiwan. Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the average Taiwanese top executives are rewarded on the basis of relative performance, and whether industry competition affects the degree of emphasis on RPE. Using a sample of Taiwanese listed firms, this study finds that there is little RPE for average top executives, but provides strong evidence supporting the argument that as the degree of industry competition is higher, RPE-based performance receives more emphasis in executive compensation. Moreover, this phenomenon is particularly prominent for non-family controlled firms, indicating RPE theory is suitable mainly for non-family controlled firms in Taiwan.

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