家族與非家族企業之總經理替換與相對績效的關聯─以台灣上市公司為例

The Relationship between Managerial Successions of Family-controlled and Non-family-controlled Businesses and Relative Performances: An Empirical Study of Taiwan Listed Companies

10.6656/MR.2011.30.3.CHI.25

林穎芬(Ying-Fen Lin)；洪晨桓(Chen-Huan Hong)；陳羽甄(Yu-Zhen Chen)

高階主管替換 ； 相對績效 ； 家族控制型企業 ； CEO Turnover ； Relative Performance Evaluation ； Family-controlled Business

管理評論

30卷3期（2011 / 07 / 01）

25 - 47

繁體中文

本研究探討強迫性高階主管替換與公司相對績效之關係，檢視公司績效不佳時，董事會是否會採取強迫高階主管替換的方式來改善公司績效。本研究以家族控制型與非家族控制型企業作為對照，觀察此二類企業在公司績效表現與總經理強迫性替換決策的關聯是否有所差異，以及當高階主管強迫替換後，是否能有效改善家族控制型或非控制型公司的經營績效。本研究採用Logistic迴歸與t檢定進行實證分析，研究結果得知會計基礎相對績效表現與總經理強迫替換有強烈關聯，然家族控制型企業之總經理則較不易因績效表現不佳而遭到替換；此外，非家族控制型企業在強迫總經理替換後公司績效表現逐漸提升，而家族控制型企業則無此顯著效果。

This study explores the relationship between CEO turnover and a company's relative performance and examines whether the board adopts CEO replacement to improve company performance. This study compares family-controlled businesses with non-family-controlled businesses to find out if there a difference in relationship between company performance and CEO turnover. This study also investigates if managing performance of either family-controlled businesses or non-family-controlled businesses improves after going through CEO replacement. This study adopts Logistic regression and t-test to analyze the data. Result shows a strong relationship between accounting based relative performance and CEO turnover. However, CEOs of family-controlled businesses are less likely to be replaced. Also, the performance of non-family-controlled businesses is found progressively improved after going through CEO replacement, whereas such effect is not as significant for family-controlled business.

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