台灣產險業再保險市場存在有資訊不對稱嗎？分位數迴歸與自然試驗法之應用

Does Asymmetric Information Exist in the Reinsurance Markets of Taiwan? Applying Quantile Regression and Natural-Experiment Method

10.6656/MR.202001_39(1).CNI021

陳瑞祥(Juei-Hsiang Chen)；許永明(Yung-Ming Shiu)

再保險 ； 資訊不對稱 ； 道德風險 ； Reinsurance ； Information Asymmetry ； Moral Hazard

管理評論

39卷1期（2020 / 01 / 01）

21 - 42

繁體中文

研究目的：本文主要目的是檢定台灣產險業再保險市場是否存在資訊不對稱。研究設計／方法：我們使用自然試驗法與若干有母數模型估計平均效果結果。研究結果：結果顯示台灣產險業再保險市場存在資訊不對稱。研究限制／啟發：由於資料無法取得，我們無法獲得再保險契約層面資料並且我們無法控制契約層面資訊。實務／社會意涵：對於再保險公司實務從業者，於承保業務上應該要更謹慎，特別要注意高損失率保險公司的分保業務。對於監理機關，可採取若干影響保險公司並且減緩此現象進而增加再保險市場效率的措施。創見／價值：本文的核心價值是辨認台灣產險業再保險市場是否存在資訊不對稱與何時資訊不對稱更加嚴重。

Purpose - The primary aim of this study is to examine whether asymmetric information exists in Taiwan non-life industry reinsurance market. Design/methodology/approach - We use a natural experiment and several parametric models to estimate the average effects results. Findings - Results have shown that the reinsurance information asymmetry phenomenon in Taiwan's reinsurance markets does exist. Research limitations/implications - Due to data unavailability, we could not obtain the reinsurance contract level data and we could not control the contract level information. Practical implications/Social implications - For reinsurer practitioners, they should be more cautious about underwriting, especially for the business ceded by high loss ratio insurers. For regulators, they might take some measures to affect insurers to mitigate such phenomenon to enhance the reinsurance market efficiency. Originality/value - The core value of this study is to identify whether asymmetric information exists in Taiwan non-life industry reinsurance market and when the asymmetric information phenomenon will be more severe.

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