激勵性薪酬結構對盈餘管理選擇策略的影響

The Impact of Incentive Compensation Structure on the Choice Strategy of Earnings Management

10.6656/MR.202001_39(1).CNI043

許永聲(Yunsheng Hsu)；陳雪如(Hsueh-Ju Chen)；黃勝華(Sheng-Hua Huang)

激勵性薪酬 ； 股票基礎薪酬 ； 應計項目盈餘管理 ； 分類移轉 ； 實質盈餘管理 ； Incentive Compensation ； Stock-Based Compensation ； Accruals-Based Earnings Management ； Classification Shifting ； Real Earnings Management

管理評論

39卷1期（2020 / 01 / 01）

43 - 66

繁體中文

研究目的：探討激勵性薪酬制度所誘發盈餘管理行為，是否只是財務報表上的操弄、還是已經犧牲企業的實質利益。而可能的不利影響，是否可以藉由適當的薪酬結構設計而減緩。研究設計／方法：本研究利用不同盈餘管理方法對企業的影響並不相同的特性，實證分析在激勵性薪酬制度下，為達成激勵薪酬盈餘目標，企業利用應計項目、分類移轉及實質盈餘管理的程度。研究結果：激勵性薪酬制度會同時增加應計項目、分類移轉及實質盈餘管理程度。不過股票基礎薪酬制度會降低企業利用實質盈餘管理，增加分類移轉及應計項目盈餘管理。研究限制／啟發：本研究僅考慮薪資、獎金及特支費、股票股利、現金股利及員工認股權五項薪酬項目。此外盈餘管理方法也僅限於分類移轉、應計項目與實質盈餘管理。理論／實務／社會意涵：激勵薪酬制度下，管理者的盈餘管理會損害企業的實質利益，但股票基礎薪酬契約就可減緩此損害程度。創見／價值：激勵性薪酬可能的不利影響，可以透過股票基礎薪酬契約減緩。

Purpose - The purpose of the paper is to explore whether the impact of an incentive compensation system is just the manipulation of financial statements or at the expense of real future benefits. Specifically, it studies whether the compensation structure mitigates the negative influences. Design/methodology/approach - By empirical study, the paper explore the influences of incentive compensation system on the use of accrual-based, classification shifting, and real earnings management. Findings - The results show that incentive compensation simultaneously increases the use of accrual-based, classification shifting, and real earnings management. And a stock-based compensation system decreases the use of real earnings management, but increases the use of classification shifting and accruals-based earnings management. Research limitations/implications - This study only considers 5 compensations including salaries, bonuses and extraordinary charges, stock dividends, cash dividends, and employee stock options. In addition, earnings management methods are limited to classification shifting, accruals-based, or real earnings management. Practical implications/Social implication -The incentive compensation harm the firm's real benefit, that could be mitigates by a stock-based compensation structure. Originality/value -A stock-based compensation structure could mitigate the negative influences of the incentive compensation system.

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