Are Independent Directors Rewarded for Their Monitoring? Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Firms

獨立董事的監督是否受到獎勵？來自中國上市公司的實證

10.6656/MR.202201_41(1).ENG023

傅浚映(Jyun-Ying Fu)

Institutional perspective ； Legitimacy ； Norm violation ； Independent director monitoring ； 制度視角 ； 正當性 ； 違反社會常規 ； 獨立董事監督

管理評論

41卷1期（2022 / 01 / 01）

23 - 42

英文

Purpose-Our study examines how independent directors' behaviors on a board might impact their career outcomes at the focal firm. We utilize an institutional lens as a guide to argue that directors who dissent at board meetings might not be reappointed by the focal firm. Additionally, by taking into account firm- and industry-level environments, we offer a more socialized view of the effect of dissenting votes on directors' reappointment. Design/methodology/approach-Our study utilizes a sample of the voting behavior of independent directors in Chinese A-share listed firms over a period of ten years from 2004 to 2013. We use the logistic regression and the multilevel logistic regression to test our hypotheses. Findings-We find that directors' dissenting votes at board meetings would reduce directors' likelihood of reappointment at the focal firm. However, the negative impact of directors' dissent on the likelihood of reappointment becomes weaker for firms experiencing executives' dissent and for firms located in fraud-plague industries. Research limitations/implications-We only examine one form of director monitoring activities, i.e., voting. Other forms of monitoring activities are worth further investigation. Practical implications/Social implications-Our findings reveal the dark side of diligent director monitoring, i.e., the reduced likelihood of reappointment by the focal firm. Directors may consider other monitoring activities such as raising potential issues about proposals beforehand. Originality/value-Our study highlights how director monitoring would be viewed as a norm-violating action and its impact on directors' career outcomes.

研究目的：本研究探討獨立董事的投票行為會如何影響獨立董事獲得公司續聘的機會。本文採用制度理論的視角，認為獨立董事在董事會議上投反對票會被認為是違反社會常規的行為，因此減少該董事被公司續聘的機會。研究設計／方法：本研究使用在中國上市公司任職的獨立董事為樣本，並且用羅吉斯迴歸和多層次羅吉斯迴歸檢測樣本假說。研究結果：本研究發現，當獨立董事在董事會會議上投反對票時，該獨立董事較不容易被該公司續聘。但若該公司的管理階層也投反對票時，則會減弱獨立董事反對票對於續聘的負面效果。同時，若該公司處在有較多公司不端行為的產業時，獨立董事反對票對於續聘的負面效果亦會減弱。研究限制／啟發：本研究只有檢視獨立董事投票此類型的監督行為。未來學者可以研究獨立董事其他類型的監督行為。理論／實務／社會意涵：本研究發現獨立董事在監督公司時可能會對其董事職涯帶來負面結果。獨立董事可以考慮其他形式的監督行為，例如在董事會開會前先和公司管理階層討論議案可能的疑慮，而非直接在董事會上投反對票。創見／價值：本研究發現獨立董事投反對票可能被視為違反常規的行為，以及其對董事自身職涯的後果。

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