BOT計畫政府與特許公司之權利金模式

The Royalty Model for BOT Projects

10.6545/JFS.2004.12(3).1

康照宗(Chao-Chung Kang)；馮正民(Cheng-Min Feng)；黃思綺(Szu-Chi Huang)

權利金 ； 數學規劃模式 ； BOT ； royalty ； mathematical programming model

財務金融學刊

12卷3期（2004 / 12 / 31）

1 - 31

繁體中文

從過去文獻研究顯示，BOT計畫權利金議題甚少為研究者所重視；然而，權利金議題在BOT談判過程卻屬重要課題之一。本文目的以政府與特許公司觀點講建BOT計畫權利金收取模式，藉以改善過去以往研究甚少討論BOT計畫權利金收取之問題。文中利用財務現金流量概念及數學規劃方法推導政府與特許公司之權利金模式，並以台北港貨櫃中心BOT計畫為例，進行實例分析，求解權利金、出資比率、政府財務回收率之最佳解，並分析政府與特許公司權利金收取範圍。經實例分析顯示，無論與以營收或是以運量為計算基礎之權利金，在特許公司追求報酬最大化下與民間出資0.94條件下，特許公司期望不緻納權利金。但政府若在民間出資0.94條件下，無論採取以總營收或運量為計算基礎之權利金，皆可獲取很高之財務回收率。

The government can get high value in GFRR through getting royalty fees from the concessionaire by means of an output-based or a revenue-based model .The royalty model of BOT projects was seldom explored in prior studies. However, this issue plays an important role in BOT negotiation. The purpose of this paper is to construct the royalty model of the BOT project based on private sectors' and government's perspectives. Net cash flow and mathematical programming approaches were employed in this study to develop the royalty model for the BOT project. A BOT project with Taipei Port Container was used as a numerical example to demonstrate the solution procedures for private construction cost ratio (PCCR), government construction cost ratio (GCC R), ongoing royalty, and government finance recovery ratio (GFRR). The results of the case show that the concessionaire will not pay the royalty to the government if the PCCR is less than 0.94 and the profit can't be maximized.

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