聲譽效果與投資

Reputation Effects and Investment

10.6545/JFS.2005.13(3).2

陳昱成(Yu Cheng Chen)；劉維琪(Victor W. Liu)

聲譽 ； 投資 ； 過度投資 ； reputation ； investment ； over-investment

財務金融學刊

13卷3期（2005 / 12 / 31）

33 - 51

繁體中文

本研究建構一個由外部投資者利用公司聲譽來評價公司的逆選擇模型，推論聲譽與投資的關係。經分析公司會操弄的聲譽效果有三種：1）利用聲譽效果：在公司類型固定的情況下，高聲譽的公司投資的機率高於低聲譽的公司，即因高聲譽而促進投資的效果；2）強化聲譽效果：在聲譽固定的情況下，好公司投資的機率高於壞公司，意即藉由投資來強化其聲譽的效果；3）訊號發射效果：當好公司聲譽被低估時，利用推案來散佈其為好公司的訊息。本研究發現：高聲譽的壞公司會出現過度投資的現象，並可利用這三種聲譽效果來解釋公司的過度投資行為。

This paper constructs an adverse selection model to infer the relationship between reputation and investment, through evaluating the consideration of outside investors in terms of the reputation of the firms. It is concluded that there are three ways firms will manipulate reputation effects. 1) ＂Using the reputation effect: given the same type of firms, the probability of investing in firms with high reputation is greater than in firms with low reputation; that is, the effect of promoting investment by high reputation. 2) ＂Strengthening the reputation effect: given the same reputation of firms, the probability of investing in good-type firms is greater than in bad-type firms; that is, the effect of strengthening their reputation by investing. 3) ＂The signaling effect: when a good company's reputation is evaluated as low, it will invest to spread that the company is actually a good company. Moreover, this model finds that the bad-type firms with high reputation are predicted to experience over-investment, and in return, the three reputation effects are applied to explain the behavior of over-investment.

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