题名 |
Strategic Choice between Joint Ventures and Mergers for Vertical Integration |
并列篇名 |
垂直整合下合資與併購之策略選擇 |
DOI |
10.6545/JFS.2009.17(3).4 |
作者 |
吳菊華(Chu-Hua Wu);胡聯國(Len-Kuo Hu) |
关键词 |
合資 ; 併購 ; 非完全契約 ; 股權結構 ; 公司控制 ; joint ventures ; mergers ; incomplete contract ; stock ownership ; corporate control |
期刊名称 |
財務金融學刊 |
卷期/出版年月 |
17卷3期(2009 / 09 / 30) |
页次 |
103 - 125 |
内容语文 |
英文 |
中文摘要 |
本文利用非完全契約理論,探討二家公司進行垂直整合時,應採取合資或併購策略。我們的結論如下:(1)採取併購策略時,主併公司給予被併公司部份股權,將比100%持有更為有利;(2)在給定外生固定的股權比率下,對欲垂直整合的二家公司而言,我們發現採取併購策略均比合資較為有利;(3)若股權比率可內生決定時,我們推導出併購與合資策略下的最適股權比率:此外在對稱的成本結構下,我們比較了二家公司在併購與合資下的努力與福利程度,發現若併購策略可有不同的股權安排時,當主併公司之股權比率介於30%至65%,其產生之整體社會效率與福利將高於50-50之合資策略。 |
英文摘要 |
Drawing upon the incomplete contract theory, this study examines the criterion of the strategic choice between joint ventures (JVs) and mergers when two firms contemplate vertical integration. Our model reaches the following conclusions: (1) some ownership provision to the acquired company after the mergers may prove to be more lucrative to the acquirer than 100% takeover: (2) given the same equity share arrangement for JVs and mergers we conclude that these two firms should choose to merge or be merged rather than JVs: (3) we derive the optimal equity share arrangement in both JVs and mergers when ownership provision is considered as a strategic means. In addition, we also compare the welfare and effort of both companies in JVs and mergers under symmetric cost structures, and find that mergers would provide greater social efficiency and welfare than 50-50 JVs when the acquirers equity share is between 30% and 65%. |
主题分类 |
社會科學 >
經濟學 社會科學 > 財金及會計學 |
参考文献 |
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被引用次数 |