網際網路興起對數位產品獨佔廠商產品決策與通路策略之影響

The Availability of Internet Outlets and Monopolistic Manufacturers' Optimal Product and Channel Strategies in a Digital Good Industry

10.6160/2006.12.01

周善瑜(Shan-Yu Chou)；張智勇(Chih-Yung Chang)；蕭櫓(Lu Hsiao)

通路策略 ； 產品政策 ； 產業結構 ； 網路通路 ； 數位產品 ； 逆選擇 ； 訊號賽局 ； Distribution Channel Strategy ； Adverse Selection ； Internet Channel ； Digital Attributes

中山管理評論

14卷4期（2006 / 12 / 01）

807 - 846

繁體中文

本研究旨在以賽局分析的方法，探討網際網路興起對數位產品產業獨佔廠商之產品品質與通路策略所造成的影響；並進一步考量此獨佔廠商在面對潛在競爭者時，均衡下產業之競爭結構及產品差異。本文考慮之數位產品為經驗財。網路興起前，廠商無法在實體通路以具成本效益的方式揭露產品品質，從而消費者無法判定產品品質，廠商也自無誘因提供高品質的產品。網路興起後，原先無法在實體通路與消費者有效溝通的產品數位屬性得以透過網路有效率地達成，例如：電玩遊戲或是教育學習軟體可透過網路以多媒體、互動的方式展示產品，因而增進消費者對於產品品質的瞭解，促進了品質資訊的揭露，也間接鼓勵了廠商提昇產品品質。在消費者可區別為「品質堅持者」（即只接受高品質產品者）與「基本需求者」（即對品質高低較不敏感者）的假設下，本研究獲致以下命題：(i)若存在足夠的上網人口與「品質堅持者」，則網路興起將帶動數位產品之品質提昇；(ii)網路興起前，廠商傾向以服務「基本需求者」為主，網路興起後，決定提昇品質的廠商則可能利用實體通路服務「品質堅持者」，利用網路通路服務所有能上網的顧客，以進行價格歧視，此時在網上之售價將較實體通路者為低；(iii)若廠商的品質水準為外生因素所決定，網路興起後，當「品質堅持者」與「基本需求者」對高品質產品保留價格的差距頗大，而「品質堅持者比例」與「上網人口比例」兩者皆高之時，擁有較高品質產品的廠商，可藉放棄實體通路、只在網上販售產品來對消費者傳遞高品質產品的訊息；(iv)網路興起前，由於消費者不易判定產品品質，均衡時無論現存或潛在進入廠商皆較無誘因生產高品質產品，使得競爭者進入市場的意願較低而市場上的產品較無差異化；網路興起後，因品質可於網上充分揭露，不同廠商可生產異質產品服務不同市場區隔，使得競爭者進入市場的意願較高且市場上產品差異化的程度較高。

This paper examines how the availability of the Internet channel may affect the performances of industries of digital goods (such as compact discs, electronic games, and computer software). Many of these digital goods are experience goods, of which consumers learn the product quality only after using them. In the absence of the Internet, firms may find it prohibitively costly to reveal the quality of their products (e.g., providing trial devices), and consequently consumers cannot judge the quality of products and firms do not have incentives to provide high-quality products. The Internet allows firms to reveal the quality of digital goods efficiently, thus encouraging firms to increase the quality levels of their products. In a market consisting of the segment of quality-concerned consumers and that of price-concerned consumers, we show that with the Internet, (i) the quality of a digital good tends to be higher; (ii) firms can use different types of outlets to achieve better screening and tend to adjust their targeting strategies; in particular, a high-quality firm may serve all internet users on the net and quality-concerned consumers at traditional outlets, thus leading the price on the net to be lower than that at the traditional outlet.; (iii) a high-quality firm can signal its quality to consumers by committing to use the Internet outlets only; and (iv) a more diffuse competitive structure will prevail in equilibrium.

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