英文摘要
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The ancient Chinese military strategist Taigong and the Confucian philosopher Xunzi both spoke of a quest for wealth, using agriculture to establish a nation. Heads of state encouraged agriculture and suppressed commerce, advancing a means of wealth promotion at variance from what we find today. This essay considers the lessons of China’s ancient quest for nationhood, particularly its path of seeking wealth as means to national strength.In the years after the Opium War, the strength of modern China suffered a heavy blow at the hands of Western powers. With the 1842 treaty that followed this conflict, China not only ceded land and paid reparations, but also in their ignorance signed an agreement with English representatives concerning the regulations for import/export taxes. It was unaware that this was a part of a nation’s sovereignty and that it was thus unnessary to negotiate it with other nations. The situation caused China to be shackled by a tariff agreement. When England and France prevailed in the second Opium War in 1858, the tariff stipulations were included in the new treaty. Again, China was unaware of the severity of the agreement, according to which it remained unable to manage its own tariffs for a long period of time, resulting as well in China being restricted in its overseas commerce and bound to a disadvantageous position. The imperialists began to humiliate China by means of this treaty. The result was that for a period of a century these imperialists remained in a position of strength in Sino-foreign trade and exploited their advantage over China.During the Daoguang and Xianfeng eras (1821-1860) China continued to be restrained by the unequal treaties and into the Tongzhi era (after 1876) it became gradually aware of Sino-foreign trade, the treatment of English law, and its long-term position of weakness. Leading officials such as Li Hongzhang, Ding Richang, Shen Baochen, Zeng Guanying, and Xie Fucheng, cognizant of the trade situation, began to reconsider key problems and the factors critical to the success and failure of the Sino-foreign trade war. Particularly after the 1884 Sino-French War, as the gap inSino-foreign trade conspicuously increased, there was widespread recognition among Chinese officials and gentry that the country had suffered a serious loss. Questions were actively presented to Qing governmental and commercial leaders in charge of maritime affairs. In addition, 1886-1894, the Shanghai Polytechnic Institute promoted written discussion of these questions among regional gentry and merchants. The best responses were rewarded and published in annual periodicals. It is evident from these writings that the Chinese deeply felt the losses that China had suffered in its foreign trade. The heart of their views, illuminating the source of China’s failure, was expressed in the South Seas official Shen Bingcheng’s essay ”A Dicussion of Silk, Tea, Tabacco, Cloth (and Opium).” Silk and tea had been China’s principle exports, but the tea trade had been expropriated by India and the silk trade had been expropriated by France. Moreover, the quantity of opium and foreign cloth entering China was increasing daily. By 1896, England had already drained China of 60,000,000 taels of silver-a shocking amount. And, indeed, this silk, tea, tobacco, and cloth were the key products of only one generation of the ongoing trade war.From 1842, as China opened five ports to foreign commerce, the earliest and fiercest competition was in the shipping industry. China’s initial Fujian and Guangdong commercial shipping venture went bankrupt. The vessals were decommissioned and fell into disrepair. Sailors and ship hands became pirates, assisting in the smuggling of opium. In slow succession, due to the import of low-cost foreign cloth, folk and female silk manufacturing was unable to sell their wares and farming villages were almost entirely cut off from their principle source of livelihood.Chinese officials and merchants gradually realized that they had to confront the blow perpetrated by foreign commerce and imbibe its lessons in order to study the steps needed to be competitive. At this time, leaders such as Zeng Guanying, Xie Bicheng, Hu Lihuan, Ma Jianzhong, and Sheng Xuanhuai had a general understanding of the systems of foreign commerce. They proposed measures in accordance with these models that would lead to a strengthening of China’s international competitiveness. In response, after 1870 they stipulated commercial regulations for Western companies, banks, insurance, shipping, telegraph, post offices, patents, religious procession, and national debt. This action can be defined as focused imitation and progressive improvement, resulting in widespread coordination with Western rules and regulations as well as competition with Western commerce.
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