災後重建政策與誘因排擠─以九二一地震後某社區營造集體行動為例

Post-Disaster Rehabilitation Policy and Incentive Crowding-out: A Case Study on the Community-building Collective Action after Chi-Chi Earthquake

10.6229/CPSR.2009.48.01

湯京平(Ching-Ping Tang)；黃詩涵(Shin-Han Huang)；黃坤山(Kuen-Shan Huang)

委託人－代理人理論 ； 社區總體營造 ； 集體行動 ； 誘因排擠 ； 增效 ； collective action ； community-building ； incentive crowding-out ； principal-agent theory ； synergy

政治學報

48期（2009 / 12 / 01）

1 - 31

繁體中文

藉由社區營造集體行動而產生的基層自治，在台灣經過多年的經驗累積，已成果斐然。相同的基層力量在災難發生後也可能成為社區重建的主要力量，然而，累積的案例研究顯示，扶持社區發展的公共政策往往反而可能扼殺社區營造自發性行動。雖然外部資源的挹注是這類草根努力的存續要件，但公共政策即興的資源挹注，可能改變了既有的社會關係與行動者的誘因結構，導致維繫行動的要素被破壞，社區營造的集體行動反而難以維繫。本研究透過深度訪談，檢視台灣中部一個災後重建社區的個案，來展示政府政策如何可能造成誘因排擠（incentive crowding-out）的效果，而終結了可貴的草根集體行動。此一個案揭露了一個未受重視的理論命題，為災後重建的制度設計，提供重要的參考依據。

Community governance can be considered as a collective action motivated by a variety of incentives, rather than a fiat relationship from public authority. While this form of grass-roots governance has been promoted in Taiwan since 1990s and many successful stories as well as valuable experiences have been accumulated in the past decades, an overall theory on factors contributing to successful governance is yet to be developed. This paper examines a famous community-building case after the Chi-Chi Earthquake to illustrate a complicate relationship among incentives for collective action in community building and governance. It indicates that material incentives might crowd out other nonmaterial incentives and thus destroy the collective action if poorly managed. The policy implication is that if the governments allocate abundant resources to targeted communities without helping them setting up fair distribution institutions, earlier success in collective action of these communities might be destroyed rather than nourished.

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